The Transparency Gap: Resource-Dependent Countries Perform Poorly on
Open Budget Index [*]
A
considerable number of developing countries are still trapped in a
vicious cycle of poverty and stagnation, despite being endowed with
significant stocks of natural resources. Research has highlighted
how natural resource abundance is often linked to slower growth
rates and actually seems to increase the likelihood that
resource-dependent countries will experience negative economic,
political and social outcomes. This phenomenon is commonly referred
to as the “Resource Curse” or the “Paradox of Plenty.”
In this brief, we examine empirically the nature and extent of
budget transparency in resource-dependent countries, as a potential
foundation on which to improve governance and development impact. We
define budget transparency as “the full disclosure of all relevant
fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner.”
Efforts to explain and address the “resource curse”
There is a growing trend among economists and development
practitioners to eschew more economistic, technical approaches —
which minimize or ignore political factors — to understanding and
addressing the “resource curse.” Instead, they are giving increasing
weight to the impact of politics, governance and economic management
on development in resource-dependent countries.
In recent years, a number of international initiatives have been
launched in response to these governance challenges. These follow
the groundbreaking work by Global Witness to end conflict,
corruption and human rights abuses related to resource exploitation.
For example, the International Monetary Fund has introduced special
guidelines on Resource Revenue Transparency to complement its focus
on Fiscal Transparency. The Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI) and “Publish What You Pay” campaign have
encouraged making information public on the payments extractive
industry companies make to governments. Through “EITI Plus,” the
World Bank encourages participating countries to go beyond the core
EITI reporting and auditing criteria to include reporting on
expenditures from extractive industry revenues in an effort to link
resource wealth with improved development outcomes.
In addition, the Revenue Watch Institute and the International
Budget Partnership (IBP) work on developing the capacity of CSOs and
other stakeholders within countries to independently monitor
government earnings and expenditures.
Efforts like these can potentially provide some insight into the
mechanisms through which domestic actors with power come to support,
or even advocate for, institutional change.
Measuring budget transparency in resource-dependent countries
The recognition that governance and institutions matter has brought
issues of transparency, accountability and civil society involvement
in the budget process increasingly to the fore as some of the main
governance challenges that resource-dependent countries must face.
Transparency can be a means of improving economic governance through
a combination of mechanisms, including strengthening public
accountability and legitimacy, facilitating policy consistency and
predictability, and promoting the better functioning of government.
However, the linkage between transparency, governance, and policies
and development outcomes is not automatic but, rather, is achieved
through the interaction of various actors, including government,
markets and civil society. In this sense, greater transparency
enables the public to understand and participate in policy decisions
and builds trust in government.
In 2002, the
International Budget Partnership began to develop a survey
instrument that provides an independent evaluation of budget
transparency across countries. The Open Budget Questionnaire
was designed to collect comparative data on the public availability
of budget information and other budgeting practices and consists of
a total of 122 questions based on generally accepted good practice
related to public financial management.
responses to the 91 questions that focus on the content and
timeliness of the seven key budget documents that all countries
should issue were averaged to form the Open Budget Index
(OBI), which assigns countries a score from 0 -100.
Table 1. Open Budget Index
|
OBI Score |
Countries |
|
Provides extensive information to citizens
(81-100) |
France, New Zealand, Slovenia,
South Africa,
United Kingdom, United States |
|
Provides significant information to citizens
(61-80) |
Botswana,
Brazil, Czech Republic,
Norway,
Peru,
Poland, Romania, South Korea, Sweden |
|
Provides some information to citizens
(41-60) |
Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ghana,
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Namibia, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania,
Turkey |
|
Provides minimal information to citizens
(21-40) |
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Georgia, Honduras, Nepal, Uganda, Zambia |
|
Provides scant or no information to citizens
(0-20) |
Angola,
Bolivia,
Burkina Faso,
Chad,
Egypt,
Mongolia,
Morocco, Nicaragua,
Nigeria,
Vietnam |
|
Source: Adapted from International Budget Project (2006).
Resource-dependent countries are marked in bold. |
Of the 59 countries included in the 2006 OBI, 24 are
resource-dependent. As you can see in Table 1 resource-dependent
countries (marked in bold) varied greatly in their budget
transparency scores — South Africa, Botswana, Norway and Peru
ranking among the best performers — while a significant number
(including Nigeria and Chad) still provided scant or no information
to their citizens. However, the fact that only four countries out of
the 24 provide extensive or significant budget information to their
citizens highlights the existence of a significant “transparency
gap.”
It is important to note that the OBI results may overstate the level
of transparency in many resource-dependent countries. This is
especially true in those countries with nationalized oil companies,
such as Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, whose operations are not evaluated in
the OBI — and which often are the source of substantial, highly
opaque off-budget spending.
This gap is also apparent between the average scores of the two
groups. Non-resource-dependent countries fare considerably better
(i.e., have much more transparent budget systems) than
resource-dependent ones. For the first group, the average OBI score
is 49.9, while that of the latter is 39.7. Assuming that budget
transparency is a reliable proxy for good economic governance, this
difference seems to support the opinion that resource-dependent
countries suffer from a governance deficit and are characterised by
unaccountable governments able to divert resource rents from
productive uses, thus fuelling wastage and corruption.
In an effort to examine this question further, a comparison was made
between countries’ OBI scores and their Human Development Index
scores (the HDI is a composite indicator looking at income together
with health and education outcomes). The comparison found that
higher OBI values corresponded to better human development
performance. While this correlation does not prove that greater
transparency and accountability bring about greater human
development, it does call for further attention to governance issues
in resource-rich countries.
Oil, transparency and democracy
Further
analysis of 2006 OBI data by Michael Ross examines the relationship
between oil dependence, budget transparency and level of democracy.
His findings provide additional insight into the “resource curse”
and point to possible strategies for addressing the apparent
discrepancy between resource wealth and economic and human
development. Ross’ statistical analysis finds a correlation between
a country’s OBI score, the measure used for budget transparency, and
its oil production.
He also
controls for the influence of income on a nation’s level of
transparency using the mean GDP per capita for the same period for
the income variable. Ross’ analysis suggests that after
controlling for income, there is a strong negative correlation
between a country’s oil production and the transparency of its
budget in 2006. In other words, as production goes up, transparency
goes down.
Conceivably,
this correlation might be caused by the concentration of
oil-producing states in regions of the world, such as the Middle
East and Africa, where budgets happen to be less transparent for
other reasons. Ross’ analysis found that region has no significant
effect on the correlation between oil wealth and transparency.
Another
possibility is that the correlation might be caused ultimately by
the effect of democracy — since many have argued that oil wealth
makes states less democratic, and states that are less democratic
may produce budgets that are less transparent. The oil/budget
transparency link might really be an oil/democracy/budget link. To
explore this possibility, Ross controls for a country’s democracy
level and finds that higher levels of democracy are indeed linked to
more transparent budgets. Its inclusion in the analysis reduces the
impact of oil production on transparency and makes this impact less
statistically significant. This implies that part of oil’s harmful
impact on budget transparency comes from its harmful impact on
democracy. However, even after accounting for the intervening role
of democracy, wealth from oil production still tends to reduce the
transparency of government budgets.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this brief, we attempted to bring together different strands of
evidence linking issues of budget transparency, resource dependency,
democracy and development performance across the world. Recent
research has increasingly focused on the importance of poor
governance and weak institutions as a key factor behind the
“resource curse.” The data from the Open Budget Initiative 2006
demonstrate that resource-dependent countries do indeed suffer from
a significant “transparency gap” in their budget systems. To the
extent to which this lack of transparency facilitates mismanagement,
corruption or other diversions of poverty-reducing spending needed
to ensure development, it suggests that governments, the
international community and CSOs must make further efforts to
promote budget transparency and accountability.
The conclusion reached by Ross that some of the budget “transparency
gap” may be connected to a “democracy gap” also has important
implications for civil society organizations. If budgets in
oil-dependent countries are not transparent, in part, because
democracy in these countries is broken, then CSOs could make their
governments’ budgets more open and accountable by work that
strengthens democracy. This work might resemble efforts in India and
countries in Africa to increase public participation in budget
implementation through such methods as citizen report cards and
social audits and other approaches to community budget monitoring.
It also might include efforts to pass and ensure the implementation
and use of Freedom of Information laws that provide a legal
framework for transparency and public participation in
decision-making processes.
[*]This
Brief was based on a more comprehensive report written for UNESCO by
Paolo de Renzio (Overseas Development Institute), Pamela Gomez
(IBP), and James Sheppard (London School of Economics and Political
Science). The Brief drew on additional research by Michael Ross (UCLA
Department of Political Science).
To receive a copy of the report for UNESCO, email us at
info@internationalbudget.org.
The
Open Budget Index 2008, which measures transparency and
accountability in over 80 countries, will be released on February 1, 2009.
Visit
www.openbudgetindex.org to see the results.