



## **Beyond Data**

**A Panorama of CSO Experiences with PRSP and HIPC Monitoring**

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## Abbreviations

BASC	Bureau des Activités Socio Caritatives
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCJDP	Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace and Development
CDRN	Community Development Resource Network
CHAZ	Community Health Association of Zambia
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSPR	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
DA	District Assembly
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCI	Development Cooperation Ireland
DDCC	District Development Community Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DHMC	District HIPC Monitoring Committee
DORP	Development Organisation of the Rural Poor
FNGO	Focal Non-Governmental Organisation
GHWP	Ghana HIPC Watch Project
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
MFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NDP	National Development Plan
NIMES	National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System
PBC	Parliamentary Budget Committee
PDCC	Provincial Development Community Committee
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PMC	Parish Monitoring Committee
PPMT	Provincial Programme Management Team
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SEND	Social Enterprise Development Foundation of West Africa
UCMB	Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau
UDN	Uganda Debt Network
UJCC	Uganda Joint Catholic Commission
UPE	Universal Primary Education
ZAMEC	Zambia Education Coalition

## Foreword

Most likely ‘monitoring’ will become the next buzzword in development aid. Thanks to the Millennium Development Goals aid has become more result oriented. Monitoring as such is an important tool to get a clear view on results. And it can help us explain the reasons behind successes or failures of aid. However, as this study reveals, monitoring goes far beyond delivering data and discussing poverty reduction strategies. Essentially, monitoring is about making people aware of their rights. It gives local communities an instrument to get an insight in why aid is poorly delivered or not tailored to their needs. Moreover, it also indicates whom to hold accountable in case of ineffective, insufficient and inefficient delivery of goods and services.

Poverty Reduction Strategies have many shortcomings: the crippled participation of Civil Society Organisations in their design, a lack of transparency of recipient countries and the bypassing of parliaments, to name a few. Nevertheless both the IMF, World Bank and bilateral aid agencies require them as precondition for rolling over past debts or obtaining new assistance. The fact that the World Bank itself has stated that country ownership in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers is unbalanced and focuses too much on recipient – donor country relations, is reason enough to question whether PRSPs actually will contribute to nationwide support of poverty reduction. The theory that PRSPs would create national ownership has not yet become practice. In many countries there is still no national support or ‘country ownership’.

However, for the time being Poverty Reduction Strategies are instruments we have to deal with. We at Cordaid wish to support partners and the processes related to the Poverty Reduction Strategies as much as we can in order to maximize real participation of civil society organisations, be it national or international.

There are examples, though rather rare, of CSOs who feel genuinely responsible for the implementation of ‘their’ PRSP. For that reason, and as a means to hold their government accountable, they engage in monitoring processes. Other CSOs used monitoring in order to empower local groups to start political discussions with their government on different levels and discuss why aid has been delivered poorly. There are also NGO’s who argue that even bi- and multilateral donors should become accountable, not to their taxpayers, but to their target groups in recipient countries. The OECD DAC aid effectiveness agenda could be a good cause to start with.

I would very much like to recommend this study to anybody who is interested to know how monitoring structures are set up, how they can contribute to empowerment of local communities and how they deliver data to engage in national lobby and advocacy activities. I thank Angela Wood for a job well done. I thank our partners who have contributed to this study and would like to thank them even more for the courage to engage in monitoring. In this way they hold their governments accountable and promote social and economic justice.

Lilianne Ploumen  
Cordaid Director International Programmes

## Introduction

An important function of CSOs is their role as government watchdogs. For many CSOs in the poorest countries this role is very new and thus is far less developed than their role as service providers. But with growing donor support (from bilateral donors and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)) for advocacy work and greater attention to good governance matters this is beginning to change. Thus CSOs are starting to develop monitoring mechanisms as a means to open up space for popular engagement in policy dialogue; to monitor their government's commitment to agreed policies and processes, and the efficiency and effectiveness of spending; and to forge democratic institutions. Which objective is emphasised depends on the context in which CSOs are working and the needs within that context, and this will have an impact on the monitoring systems developed.

The reasons for monitoring often overlap. Amongst the CSOs that Cordaid supports, the motivations are:

- to enforce accountability, good governance, democracy, and combat corruption: SEND Foundation (SEND), Uganda Debt Network (UDN);
- to empower local communities: UDN, Development Organisation of the Rural Poor (DORP), SEND Foundation;
- to hold the government accountable for implementing its PRS: Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR);
- to improve the effectiveness of government spending and policy making from a pro-poor perspective, particularly the delivery of public services: UDN, CSPR, DORP.

In contrast to CSO watchdogs in industrialised countries who have access to government data of reliable quality, can engage with parliamentarians and government through formal government channels, and have good access to a free media, CSOs in poor countries are faced with a dearth of data, few mechanisms and structures with which to engage with government, and in some cases a constrained or uninterested media. Thus CSOs in these countries have been required to develop their own monitoring mechanisms to generate data, which engage government but are often parallel to governments' own monitoring structures.

International donors have been keen to support CSOs in developing countries to put in place such structures. There are a number of motivations for wanting to do so. INGOs have an incentive to promote and financially support monitoring as part and parcel of the capacity development niche they have adopted in the PRSP process given the shift in policy engagement to the south. Also they are accountable to their own constituents and the general public who mobilised at their prompting to campaign for debt relief and thus they want to be able to show that debt relief has proved beneficial to the poor. Equally bilateral and multilateral donors have a strong incentive to facilitate grass roots monitoring. Firstly, HIPC funds have gone directly into government budgets (in some cases ring-fenced); secondly there is a growing shift towards budget support; thirdly conditionality is focused on second and third generation institutional reforms; and fourthly having committed to the Millennium Development Goals donors now need to show results. Aid and debt money flowing directly into the budget, institutional based reforms, and outcomes and impacts on

the poor are notoriously difficult for donors to monitor, which heighten concerns about corruption and makes an aid mechanism based on conditionality and results hard to administer. Because donors cannot directly monitor governments they have a clear incentive to enable civil society to be their eyes and ears on the ground. Thus there is a need to create a demand for transparency because without civil society's engagement, improving the transparency of government institutions, which donors are pushing for, is meaningless. Transparency is merely a tool which needs a pro-active civil society ready to make use of the information that is provided and the spaces for engagement that are opened up.

Most civil society-based monitoring structures are very new and are still being developed. A wide variety of structures reflect different objectives, local challenges, political structures and cultural norms. All have faced difficulties in becoming operational but whilst these are still being ironed out they are already beginning to show results, and more CSOs are taking initiative to set up new monitoring projects.

Although monitoring processes are still in their infancy there is now considerable experience with undertaking monitoring and carrying out advocacy based on its results, which makes this an opportune time to take-stock and reflect on what is working, what has not worked, what obstacles exist and how these have been or might be overcome. This is what this report sets out to do. The hope is that by doing so CSOs already engaged in monitoring might benefit from each others' experiences and from cross fertilisation of ideas. However, it must be borne in mind that political systems and cultures differ massively from country to country and what might work in one country might not in another. Equally what doesn't work in one country might well do in another. Furthermore, it is hoped that this report will prove insightful for other CSOs who might be considering embarking on monitoring, giving them pointers to what needs to be considered when doing so.

The scope of this report is limited to CSOs who are engaged in budget monitoring and/or tracking HIPC and PRSP expenditures and their outcomes and impacts. The focus is principally on 4 CSOs that Cordaid partners with: Uganda Debt Network in Uganda; Civil Society for Poverty Reduction in Zambia; SEND Foundation in Ghana; and Development Organisation of the Rural Poor in Bangladesh. The analysis of UDNs and CSPRs experiences is based on interviews in Uganda and Zambia with CSOs, donors, parliamentarians and government representatives carried out between 25th September and 7th October 2005, and also draws on various evaluation documents and reports. Their experiences are supplemented with other CSOs' experiences whom the author met during her visits to these countries. The analysis of experiences in Ghana and Bangladesh is based on evaluation reports and responses to questionnaires.<sup>1</sup> The report also draws on discussions at a workshop on experiences with monitoring held in Nairobi from 27-28<sup>th</sup> October 2005. The meeting organised by Cordaid brought together UDN, SEND Foundation, CSPR and DORP, as well as other CSOs from Ethiopia (PANE?, CRD?), Kenya (Cordaid) and Cameroon (BASC) who have started to monitor or are in the process of developing plans to do so.

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<sup>1</sup> The reports based on questionnaires were produced DORP in Bangladesh; BASC in Cameroon; and SEND in Ghana.  
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## Executive Summary

CSOs have shown that they are able to set up effective structures for monitoring and to collect useful data which is additional to governments' own. Getting the structure 'right' has in most cases been a matter of learning by doing. Over time, there is a tendency for centralised structures to become more decentralised. Firstly, decentralised monitoring is more cost efficient because it cuts down on travel costs. Secondly, it is a means to expand coverage which can be constrained by staff limitations at the centre. Thirdly, where responsibility for public service provision is decentralised this suggests the need to engage with local governments. As monitoring becomes more decentralised there is also a need for decentralised management of the process.

As decentralisation proceeds or when monitoring structures are being established, sufficient time needs to be put in right at the beginning to ensure that there is clear understanding between the central CSO and local monitoring teams as to who is responsible for what activities, and what the nature of the relationship between the two is. In the cases of CSPR and SEND the necessary time needed for initial consultations to establish local monitoring structures seems to have been under-estimated, this reflects an under-estimation of the limited capacity of CSOs at the local level. It is particularly important to be clear about the funding relationship and how much own resources and time local CSOs and community members are expected to contribute.

Care needs to be taken when selecting CSOs as local monitoring partners to ensure that they have sufficient staff, financial and logistical capacity to fulfil the role assigned to them, or that if not, that they have the means to increase their capacity. Where there is a lack of capacity, the central CSO needs to assume some responsibility for helping to resource the local CSO (or community members), and be prepared to provide a significant amount of backstopping support. It is not uncommon for CSOs to take on monitoring activities as a means to access additional finance.

Logistical needs include computers, telephones, office space, and transport, which is the most essential item. CSO staff members who take on, or are assigned, monitoring tasks as part of their job, need to ensure that sufficient time is allocated for these additional activities in their work plans. Where this is not the case staff either become overburdened or give insufficient attention to monitoring activities, which impacts on the quality of data collected. Monitoring should be regarded as part of the CSO's core business rather than a side-line activity.

Skills gaps are most notable at the local level and considerable capacity building efforts have to be focused here. All skills need building – research methods, data collection, reporting - but the most severely lacking are analytical and advocacy skills. Team building skills would also be useful and have not yet been a focus of capacity building. If local CSOs are to independently finance their monitoring activities then fundraising and accounting skills are also likely to be necessary.

There is a rapid turnover of monitors which can be problematic. In the absence of sufficient finance to pay monitors it is necessary to motivate them through other means such as the benefits their communities will receive, and appealing to their social responsibility and religious teachings. In addition monitors need to feel some ownership for the process and the outcomes. However, turnover is also a natural phenomenon as people move job, get

promoted and die, which points to the need for training to be a more or less continuous process. Thus decentralising training by training trainers is important to increase capacity and to ease the burden on the central CSO. Monitors also need to feel secure that their activities will not lead to reprisals. Empowerment through education can embolden community members and alleviate such fears. However, central CSOs also need to carefully consider what their responsibility is for ensuring that those they encourage to monitor corruption are protected from any abuse, and be prepared to stand up for and stand by the side of monitors who may suffer reprisals. This is equally an issue that donors need to consider.

Different monitoring structures involve community members to different degrees. At the very minimum it is typical that effort will be made to mobilise and empower local communities by informing them of their rights and government commitments regarding provision of public services and community development programmes to encourage them to claim and make use of these. Empowerment of this sort can shift the relationship and locus of respect between communities and local service providers. In some mechanisms local communities are also involved in local meetings to report back monitoring results at which they can raise their own concerns to local officials or MPs. Whether in public meetings or through other means, it is important to report monitoring findings back to communities to build their ownership for the process and prevent consultation fatigue: communities should not be seen as just providers of data. In mechanisms where community empowerment is the primary objective community members themselves may be engaged in doing their own monitoring and advocacy. As a result of the empowering effects of being involved in monitoring processes there appears to be a concomitant increase in communities' involvement in local planning processes, which further facilitates their involvement in monitoring activities.

Central governments give mixed signals as to their support for CSO monitoring. On the one hand they do provide letters of authorisation to CSOs to access data from local government departments and to instruct local governments to engage with monitoring processes. However, there is still little effort to engage civil society in formal government monitoring structures, and they do little more to promote CSO activities to local governments. As a consequence local governments are not particularly supportive of CSO monitoring although officials do cooperate. Overall, there seems to be more willingness to provide data (although even this may often be obstructed), than to take remedial actions, especially if this might affect an official's illicit source of income. Even where local government administrative staff is involved in monitoring teams, it should not be assumed that action will be taken without being prompted to do so by political leaders. Thus involvement of elected officials is important, particularly in report back processes that directly involve community members.

Local governments' lack of attention to CSO findings reflects that CSO monitoring is not formally recognised or integrated into the central government's monitoring processes. Thus they are not duty bound to respond to CSO findings, although those CSOs with a strong national profile have greater leverage. The threat of public exposure is particularly motivating for government officials, thus use of the media is important. However, there are mixed views as to how closely CSOs should align themselves with government processes. Many perceive that the strength of CSO processes is that data and analysis is additional and independent of government. Whilst others perceive that some partnership with government is probably necessary in order to achieve the desired level of credibility, influence and coverage.



The quality of monitoring data is essential and will become more so if it is fed into policy processes. It is easy for government officials to dismiss CSO findings on the basis of shoddy monitoring. Thus, good training of monitors and the use of appropriate methods to triangulate data are important. However, a greater emphasis placed on good data collection may imply a greater need to involve better educated and technically trained people in monitoring teams. The effect may be to alienate monitoring teams from local communities, especially if public debates become more technical or local people become less engaged. Likewise, donor and government demands for standardised and possibly more quantitative data might have a tendency to skew CSO processes away from their original aims. Whether there is a trade-off between policy processes and political processes needs to be carefully considered.

There are demands for expansion of monitoring activities from above and below but in most cases expansion is constrained by a lack of resources at the centre. Three choices are possible: 1) raise more resources at the centre; 2) enable local teams/networks to raise own resources but have to deal with potential change in relationship; 3) export structure/mechanism to other CSOs/networks. However, it seems important to give careful consideration to the need to expand and by how far: whether this in fact necessary depends to a large extent on the objective of monitoring and the quality of data that is desired. If the desire is to feed into evidence-based policy making then it may be necessary to increase coverage to achieve at least a representative sample. Likewise, if the aim is to mobilise the grassroots then presumably greater coverage is desirable. But if the desire is to find good stories backed up with reasonable evidence for advocacy then there may be little need to expand coverage. Thus the need to expand depends on whether monitoring is intended to support a political process or a 'scientific' process. Whilst greater coverage might strengthen CSO monitoring all that is needed is a sufficiently large sample to ensure findings cannot be ignored.

In spite of local government's tendency to not fully cooperate with (or even obstruct) CSO monitoring processes, monitoring has had remarkable successes, particularly at the local level where services have improved, poor work has been rectified and petty corruption has been addressed, and local communities have been empowered to demand their rights and engage in local planning processes. Also the few cases of government staff and contractors being reprimanded, discharged and blacklisted have served as examples to others. Empowerment of local communities to demand their rights to services due to them, plus service providers' awareness that they are being monitored, may often be sufficient to achieve significant improvements at the community level in public service delivery. Impacts on policy making are far less apparent. This can be explained by a lack of advocacy capacity, plus a lack of opportunities to engage in policy making forums. However, many interviewees reported not seeing reports and analysis that is being produced. Thus more attention needs to be given to distributing reports and newsletters on a regular basis. Working with the media, which is receptive to reporting monitoring analysis, is an effective mechanism for distributing results, engaging the public and for putting pressure on the government to take action.

Little is actually known about the impact of monitoring. In some cases there appears to be a lack of attention to following-up government actions once monitoring results have been reported. Why not is not clear but this may be because monitoring and decision-making takes place at different levels. Thus some CSOs do not really know the impact of their

activities. Neither has any attention been given to evaluating impacts or documenting results. Such steps would be helpful both to demonstrate to other CSOs - who are not monitoring but might be persuaded to - what can be achieved, as well as encouraging donors to provide greater financial support. Documenting experiences, particularly successes and on-going problems could also be a useful means to engage the media.

## Report

### Motivations for Monitoring

Monitoring is a natural step for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) following extensive campaigns for debt reduction and engagement in the formulation of poverty reduction strategies (PRSs). Those who have campaigned for debt relief have been strongly motivated to make sure that the freed up resources go to help those who are most needy and that they don't get funnelled into pet projects or line the pockets of politicians and bureaucrats. Likewise, those who have worked long and hard to mobilise civil society to input into the development of PRSs and who feel ownership of them want to ensure their efforts do not go to waste and are determined to prevent their governments from simply shelving them to gather dust now that debt relief has been granted. They are also concerned to keep open political space for engagement with governments that the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process has – however imperfectly - created.

Monitoring is also seen as a means to push for democracy by creating forums for dialogue and a framework for civil society engagement with government. This implies a strong focus on people's empowerment and people's engagement in the monitoring process as a means to stimulate greater awareness amongst citizens of their rights to engage in decision-making processes that will affect their lives. Thus monitoring is a means to stimulate empowerment and participation, and to shift the locus of power away from governments and to motivate communities to think differently about their relationship to government.

The purpose of monitoring can be understood in terms of short-term and long-term goals. Short-term goals include improving public expenditure management, the quality and quantity of public services, government and donor policies, and the participation of people in planning, decision-making and project implementation. Long-term goals are improved welfare and sustainable livelihoods, particularly of the poorest, and establishment of democratic processes. Thus monitoring is a means to an end, not the end itself. Which end goal is the principle driving force behind monitoring may well depend on the degree to which civil society has engaged with HIPC and PRS processes or not. For example, CSPR has strong ownership of Zambia's PRS and thus has a strong incentive to see it implemented. Likewise, UDN has campaigned extensively for debt reduction to benefit the poorest, thus it has a strong incentive to ensure that debt relief funds get through to the poorest. However, CSOs in Ghana have had little input into the development of the PRS and thus monitoring it is not a priority. Nor is there much impetus to monitor a PRS that is not even government owned. Instead, for SEND Foundation building democratic institutions is the principle objective.

Moreover, whichever is the end goal, more and more CSOs are being attracted to develop monitoring mechanisms because they see these as a platform from which to engage with government.

### What to Monitor?

Broadly speaking, two areas are typically monitored: 1) expenditures are tracked from budget allocation to actual spending on the ground; and 2) public services or government

programmes are tracked in relation to the inputs provided and/or outputs and outcomes achieved. In addition analysis of the entire budget is sometimes undertaken in parallel, usually with a focus on what proportion of resources is being allocated for pro-poor sectors such as health, education, roads, agriculture and water and sanitation.

What is monitored depends on the objective(s). A goal of improving pro-poor policy suggests that monitoring will likely focus on access to and output of services and outcomes for users and their families. Which sectors are chosen is often determined according to the priority areas identified in the country's PRS or national development plan. Alternatively, if anti-corruption and efficient public expenditure are the objectives, then monitoring is likely to focus on flows of money from central to local government to the community, and the quality and cost-effectiveness of services, infrastructure and programmes provided.

It is not untypical for a CSO to initially focus on just one aspect such as monitoring and as confidence and capacity grows to deepen the focus. For example, Zamec in Zambia plans to start monitoring financial flows into the education sector but is considering to also monitor quality in the future.<sup>2</sup> In CSPR's case, poverty monitoring was first carried out and later expenditure monitoring was introduced to inform and strengthen CSPR's poverty analysis.

In some cases monitoring has focussed only on monitoring projects financed with funds freed up by debt relief (often known as 'HIPC' funds), whilst in others monitoring has focused on all resources flowing into a particular sector. Focusing just on HIPC funds can be problematic when data is not disaggregated or readily available. For example, CSPR is monitoring use of HIPC funds as a means to monitor implementation of the PRSP, however, it has found it hard to distinguish HIPC funds from other sources of funding for a particular programme or project, and typically communities are unaware of the sources of funding for particular projects.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, HIPC funds are only a small fraction of the overall funds that are used to implement PRSP related programmes. Thus by only focusing on HIPC spending a large part of the PRSP might be being neglected.

Indicators for poverty monitoring are likely to be drawn directly from the PRSP policy and results matrix or selected to be compatible with PRSP indicators and targets. Availability of government data may also determine the choice. If efficiency and quality of government spending or anti-corruption is the objective then monitoring is likely to be based on budget commitments, programme commitments and government procurement, construction and accounting guidelines. For example, UDN's Parish Monitoring Committees (PMCs) monitor the quality of infrastructure projects in relation to the government's procurement and construction guidelines.

The number of sites monitored typically depends on availability of financial resources and human capacity, both of which are often limited. The choice of sites is often determined according to: 1) where well capacitated CSO partners are located; 2) accessibility considerations, such as, ability to access sites throughout the year, and travelling time to reach sites; and 3) desire to observe trends in different communities, such as, observing differences between rural, provincial and urban poor.

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with Hendrina Doba.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Joseph Mbinji.

## Monitoring Structures and Processes

Different objectives imply different mechanisms, structures, data requirements and engagement of stakeholders within them. Key considerations that are likely to influence the choice of monitoring structure and process include:

- What is the purpose?
- Who should do the monitoring?
- Where is there capacity (or where can it be built)?
- Who can get access to government data?
- What range of data needs to be collected?
- What quality of data needs to be collected?
- Does monitoring need to be continuous?
- Which level of government needs to be targeted?
- Who does reporting?
- Who does advocacy?
- Who finances monitoring activities?

For example, if community empowerment is the objective community members may be encouraged to undertake the monitoring and/or engage in public forums, with advocacy focused on engaging local politicians and officials. Whereas, if a more refined pro-poor policy is the objective then whilst grass roots communities may be the focus of monitoring the monitors may need to be better educated and skilled. Or if the focus is on preventing corruption this may suggest the need for continuous monitoring compared with monitoring to measure the outputs and outcomes of a programme which may mean monitoring only needs to be done once or twice a year.

Monitoring structures and processes have tended to develop over time with experience and learning. Thus the need for flexibility would seem to be an essential requirement. It may, therefore, be an advantage that civil society's monitoring arrangements have not typically been formalised and incorporated into government monitoring and evaluation processes yet. It also reflects that there may have been a tendency to rush into the process without being totally clear about for what end or how best to undertake it. The latter is understandable given that there has been little or no previous experience with monitoring in many countries, which suggests the need to document experiences more fully so that others can learn from them.

Whilst SEND's monitoring structure is functioning as planned, a network in Southern Ghana has been added to compliment the network in Northern Ghana in the light of arguments that this was necessary for its monitoring and advocacy to be perceived as unbiased.

UDN, which has arguably had the longest experience of monitoring, has introduced new monitoring mechanisms over the course of time as its early monitoring experiences have helped to clarify its objectives. It has shifted from a centralised process of ad hoc monitoring and government engagement to a grass-roots process as a means to expand monitoring activities; facilitate continuous monitoring; in accordance with its objective of empowering the grass roots; and as a result of finding that engagement with central government on local issues was ineffective and thus local government engagement was necessary.

CSPR's poverty monitoring process has adapted in light of the fact that the impacts of pro-poor policies and higher spending on poverty take time to be observed and are costly to

monitor. Thus monitoring which was carried out twice-yearly has been cut back to annually with the option of possibly moving to every two years being mooted. CSPR has also introduced the cross-cutting issues of gender and HIV/AIDs in addition to its sectoral focus; and the process has become more decentralised as a means to expand capacity beyond the CSPR secretariat by drawing on the capacity of its provincial network members, and in the light of the government's decentralisation agenda.

Decentralisation of monitoring activities seems to be a quite common experience principally driven by the costs of monitoring and the large numbers of people that are required, which, for example, have been too much for both UDN and CSPR to bear on their own. The decentralisation of service provision and financial control to local government, which many governments are pursuing with World Bank support, is likely to be another important factor pushing the decentralisation of CSO monitoring structures. Although SEND's structure is already decentralised to the extent that monitoring is carried out by district teams, SEND is also planning to decentralise administrative and management functions to the regions through the appointment of field officers.

Devoting sufficient time to properly set up the monitoring structure right at the beginning can help to avoid confusion and problems later on. For example, SEND's problems with some of its Focal NGOs (FNGOs) has been attributed to the speed at which they were appointed, with insufficient time given to planning, budgeting and communicating clearly with prospective partners. As a result of the rushed selection process several CSOs were appointed without a clear sense of what the role would entail and the commitment and resources they would have to devote to it. The result has been that SEND has had to devote a considerable amount of time and resources to FNGO capacity building and to providing backstopping support to FNGOs. In some cases, the lack of FNGO capacity has resulted in poor monitoring results and poorly functioning District HIPC Monitoring Committees (DHMCs).<sup>4</sup> Similarly, CSPR possibly moved too quickly to set up provincial networks without being fully aware of the capacity constraints at the provincial level and without fully thinking through what the relationship between the provincial networks and the national network would be.

## **Awareness Raising and Capacity Building**

To generate a demand for transparency, public accountability and delivery of public services at the local level it is necessary to begin with a programme of awareness raising and capacity building. A first step is typically to focus on raising awareness about basic rights and empowering people and community groups through the provision of information. In addition, UDN, SEND and CSPR provide basic economic literacy training, around issues such as what is a PRSP and how can civil society engage in PRS processes, why budgets are important, and how budgets are formulated. To facilitate this training both UDN and CSPR have produced simplified guides to various aspects of the economy, such as the budget or the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility programmes as a means to demystify these processes.

A general experience is that local people can be greatly empowered. In Uganda and Zambia, armed with awareness and knowledge, community members at the grassroots and CSOs in

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<sup>4</sup> Answers to questionnaire and evaluation report.

districts and provinces have become emboldened not just to engage in monitoring but to have active involvement in local development and planning processes too. Thus they have become more engaged in the full cycle of local decision-making and implementation processes. This engagement in the beginning stages of decision-making helps facilitate monitoring as monitors are better informed of decisions that have been taken. Demystifying the budget has been an important step in stimulating engagement. It has been important to make people understand that budgets are not something that only experts can understand and decide.<sup>5</sup>

Next follows training on how to monitor and do advocacy. This might typically include: how to choose what to monitor; how to select indicators; how to formulate and use monitoring; where and how to access data; how to prepare reports; and how to do advocacy and work with the media. SEND, UDN and CSPR have produced training and monitoring manuals to facilitate these processes. It is important in this process to spend time to get clear with monitors what the objectives of monitoring are and why so that they are sure about what they are doing. This helps to ensure that when data is collected it is appropriate and of good quality.

For UDN and CSPR and the Catholic Commission for Justice, Development and Peace (CCJDP) training has been a more or less constant activity. Existing monitors have needed to have their skills updated as monitoring processes and tools have developed, for example with the introduction of HIV/AIDS and gender issues into CSPR's monitoring framework or to improve the quality of reporting in UDN's case; and a rapid turnover of monitors and an expansion of monitoring activities has demanded a constant supply of new monitors. Decentralising training activities by training trainers has been important to be able to meet demand for training.

Although capacity is improving generally gaps remain. There is a lack of analytical capacity particularly at grassroots and provincial levels and to a lesser extent at central level. For example, CSPR has found that it needs to contract in expertise to analyse monitoring data and to carry out ad hoc evaluations. Although the secretariat's own analytical capacity is good the staff is too few and other national CSPR members do not necessarily have the analytical capacity to take up the slack. In UDN's case it has had to devote considerable staff time to help PMCs compile reports. Likewise all data is collected at DORP's central office because its monitors do not have analytical capacity.

Effective communication and team building skills are also needed to improve communication with government officials and amongst monitoring team members. SEND's evaluation suggested that armed with such skills Focal NGOs (FNGOs) would have built better relationships with the DAs. Likewise, relationships between members of CSPR's provincial monitoring teams have not always been as productive as they could be due, for example, to dynamics between resource holders and other team members, which has in some cases impacted on the quality of monitoring.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Christine Nantongo.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with John Milimo.

## Formation of Monitoring Teams

The distance of monitoring sites from roads and transport routes makes monitoring a time and resource intensive activity, which means centralised monitoring teams are often inefficient. Thus both UDN and CSPR have shifted from a structure where monitoring was undertaken by a few researchers based in the capital city to a decentralised system of provincial or community-based monitors, and SEND adopted a decentralised structure from the beginning.

UDN has helped to form Parish Monitoring Committees (PMCs) comprised of community members who conduct their own monitoring and do their own advocacy based in their own communities. This is in line with UDN's focus on monitoring as a means to empower local communities and make political space for them to engage in decision-making processes. However, it is perhaps more typical that monitoring teams draw staff from local CSOs/CBOs and are formed at the provincial or district level. These teams then travel into local communities to monitor. For example, CSPR's provincial monitoring teams are comprised of staff from CSOs in CSPR's provincial networks, whilst SEND Foundation has formed District HIPC Monitoring Committees (DHMCs) comprised of CSO and CBO representatives and local government officials from the District Assembly (DA). The inclusion of government officials in monitoring teams is seen to be a means to get access to data and to stimulate local governments to take remedial action where necessary.

It is common for monitoring teams to pick their own members, who are often nominated by their CSO/CBO or community members. Often team members will be well regarded individuals in the community or district, such as, teachers, doctors, retired civil servants, priests and community leaders. The credibility of team members is important if local government people are to be encouraged to participate in monitoring activities themselves or engage in feedback processes. This is particularly so for community-based monitoring teams. Typically team members need at least a basic level of literacy and numeracy. However, a need for better quality or technical data often demands better educated monitors.

Typically, monitors are volunteers and are unpaid, although DORP is unusual in that it employs monitors. CSO staff members take on monitoring activities as part of their work activities, whilst community volunteers do monitoring in their own time. Where monitors are drafted from other CSOs there can be problems with the allocation of staff and volunteers' time, particularly if monitoring activities are not incorporated into staff's work plans.<sup>7</sup> Local CSO staff can become overburdened and have insufficient time for monitoring, or become frustrated when other monitoring team members do not pull their weight.<sup>8</sup> Whilst the problem of using volunteer monitors who have other jobs is that they can only carry out monitoring in their spare time.<sup>9</sup> The implication is that monitors cannot respond quickly if a need is suddenly identified. Also it can be tricky to find suitable times when all monitors are available to do monitoring. For example farmers need to be in their fields at

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<sup>7</sup> SEND has found that monitors need to meet more often than was originally envisaged, putting increased demands on them. [SEND Evaluation.]

<sup>8</sup> In Zambia, this problem has been compounded by the need to make unplanned for inputs into development of the National Development Programme which will replace the PRSP when it expires at the end of 2005. The problem is that the same few organisation and people are involved in many processes.

<sup>9</sup> Unlike in UDN's system, it is unlikely that volunteers will be personally motivated by the potential for obtaining better services since they themselves are not likely to benefit directly from them.



certain times of the year and teachers in the classroom at other times.<sup>10</sup>

## **Drop Outs and Maintaining Engagement**

UDN, SEND Foundation and CSPR have had to address the problems of monitors dropping out of the process. This can arise for a number of reasons depending on whether monitors are drawn from the communities themselves or from local CSOs, whether they volunteer or are paid, and what monitoring focuses on. Reasons include: lack of remuneration; fear of reprisal; death; promotion and change of job.

### Remuneration

Remuneration is a sensitive issue for community-based monitors in particular. Monitoring is a time consuming activity that takes people away from their livelihoods, for example farmers from tending their crops. This can be a problem if community monitors are not financially rewarded for their time and effort. UDN argues that it simply cannot afford to provide allowances or wages. Instead, it relies on community members being motivated by other factors such as a sense of civic duty and satisfaction and personal benefit from securing improved services for their families and community.<sup>11</sup> The implication is that monitoring must therefore achieve visible results at the community level in order to sustain enthusiasm.

Remuneration seems to be less of an issue where monitors are drawn from local CSOs who undertake the monitoring as part of their job and thus incur no personal expense, or who volunteer in local network-based organisations such as Jubilee Zambia (linked to JCTR) but have other paid employment.<sup>12,13</sup> However, members of SEND's DHMCs have asked for some payment (even if a token) in order to keep them motivated, even though they have employment. This may reflect a lack of ownership, since DHMC members tend to feel that they are working for SEND, or it may reflect feelings of overwork.<sup>14</sup>

### Fear of Reprisal

Fear of reprisal can deter monitors engaged with monitoring budget execution and corruption. In Uganda, the problem for some monitors is that they are likely to know the people they are monitoring and may live in the same village, which means that monitoring can become a very personalised and politicised activity. Unless they can be assured of some support and protection from the central CSO there can be reluctance to point the finger.<sup>15</sup>

UDN has tried to address these fears by encouraging as many people as possible in a community to engage in monitoring and to encourage whole communities to participate in reporting to local leaders to try to limit monitoring being identified with any one (or group

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Emmanuel Mali, CCJDP.

<sup>11</sup> Likewise, Caritas argues that communities should want to do monitoring because they see it is for their own benefit.

<sup>12</sup> CCJDP relies on its volunteers (also drawn from local branches of Jubilee Zambia) to be motivated by their faith, that is, by a sense of a catholic duty or social responsibility. However, this sense of civic responsibility seems to be waning as commitment to Catholicism wanes. Thus it has become harder for the CCJDP to recruit and motivate monitors.

<sup>13</sup> JCTR has employed 'facilitators' on a part time basis who receive a small stipend to carry out basic organisational and administration activities on behalf of their Jubilee Zambia group. [Interview with Saul Banda]

<sup>14</sup> SEND Evaluation.

<sup>15</sup> Although extreme, there have been two known cases of monitors being put in jail in Uganda (one was later released but the other is still thought to be in prison). [Interview with Moses Isooba.]

of) individual(s). Thus numbers matter. Another suggestion has been that community groups should form coalitions with other CBOs and CSOs at the district level to give them more weight, although they have failed to do so.<sup>16</sup> UDN staff also spends a considerable amount of time with monitors, particularly new PMCs, to see them through the whole process, since the visibility of a national CSO is likely to deter anyone seeking reprisals. Likewise, a church presence also appears to allay fears somewhat. Thus for example, Caritas members at the level of the diocese will stay with the monitoring community for a considerable period of time to both assist them with the monitoring process and to provide 'political' support.

The fear of reprisal seems to vary from country to country and may well depend on the likelihood of action being taken in the light of evidence of misuse of funds and on the relationship with the local government. For example, JCTR in Zambia claims that fear of reprisals is not an issue since engagement with the government is done very sensitively without pointing to specific individuals, thus local officials are appreciative rather than suspicious of monitors' intentions. However, JCTR cited only one example of an official being charged with corruption.<sup>17</sup>

Central CSOs need to carefully consider what their responsibility is for ensuring that those they encourage to monitor corruption are protected from any abuse, and be prepared to stand up for and stand by the side of monitors who may suffer reprisals. This is equally an issue that donors need to consider. Donors have considerable leverage and access to government to ensure that should problems arise at the local level that pressure is put on Central Government to investigate these. Discussions with DFID and DCI staff, who are very pro-active in championing the cause of good governance, revealed that they were less keen to acknowledge the need to stand-by local people who dare to stand up to local powers, although they agreed they should consider this. They have suggested that a lack of communication often means that they do not hear about incidents in time. This would suggest that it is important to consider what sort of communication mechanisms might be needed between local monitors, central CSOs and international donors to protect those who may be putting themselves at risk.

### Job Change and Promotion

For CSPR the turnover of monitors is principally caused by monitors being promoted within their organisations which means they no longer can focus on monitoring or by monitors leaving the district for a new job. To address this problem CSPR has started to train more monitors than it needs so that if a monitor should leave his/her job or organisation then there are others who can replace him/her. Despite the quick turnover of monitors a core has remained and over time their capacity has been improving. Thus they have been able to get better data, which has enriched CSPR's analysis. They also ensure that standards are maintained and can quickly bring new monitors up to speed.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with Charles Mbeeta Businge.

<sup>17</sup> There have been more cases of contractors being made to redo shoddy work, in some cases paying for this out of their own pockets, and contracts being revoked. [Interview with Saul Banda.]

<sup>18</sup> Interview with John Milimo.

## Relationship between the Central CSO and Local Monitoring Teams

Managing the relationship between the central CSO and the local monitoring teams can be challenging at times. There may be a tendency for local monitoring teams to see themselves as dependent on, or want to maintain a close relationship with, the central CSO. For example, UDN encourages its PMCs to be totally autonomous. However, in practice the PMCs lack many basic resources and skills which means they are reliant upon UDN to finance many of their activities, to provide basic logistical support, and provide skilled staff to compile reports. Moreover, the PMCs want to remain associated with UDN because UDN's name and visible presence is important to lend them credibility in the eyes of local government officials. Thus, they insist that they are workers for UDN.<sup>19</sup>

Alternatively, local teams may begrudge that the monitoring work they do is all for the central CSO and doesn't sufficiently link into their own work priorities. Thus they may regard themselves simply as workers for the central CSO and have little ownership of the process or they may demand to be more independent to follow their own priorities. CSPR's secretariat is trying to balance building greater ownership of the monitoring process amongst its provincial monitoring teams without them becoming too independent. For example, the secretariat has encouraged provincial teams to identify their own priorities for monitoring in addition to the core areas which all provincial teams are required to monitor; and to undertake their own advocacy by providing advocacy training and encouraging provincial networks to produce their own campaign materials.<sup>20</sup> The challenge is now to ensure that monitoring priorities identified at the provincial levels are compatible and complimentary with the secretariat's priorities so that advocacy at central and provincial levels can reinforce each other.

The funding relationship between the central CSO and its local teams can be a key factor defining the relationship. If UDN would like to encourage its PMCs to be independent it must first help them to become financially independent. UDN has proposed that the PMCs form networks at the district level which can be registered as CBOs and thus raise their own funds. In contrast, the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) has refused offers from donors such as SNV (CSO donor in the Netherlands) and Development Cooperation Ireland to fund some of its local Jubilee Zambia teams on the basis that they do not have the capacity to manage increased funds because good quality administrative and accounting skills are not available in the provinces. The concern is that JCTR would not be able to ensure that its high standards of accountability and transparency would be maintained at the provincial level. Having its own books in order is vital given that JCTR is monitoring corruption. However, it does encourage independence in other ways, such as encouraging Jubilee teams to do their own media work at the national and provincial level, for which it provides training.<sup>21</sup>

Managing expectations about the financial relationship between the central CSO and the provincial teams is particularly important. A factor motivating some local CSOs to participate in monitoring activities may be that they perceive that the central CSO will be a source of funds which will help to sustain the organisation. For example, SEND has developed Partnership Agreements which form the basis of the relationship between itself,

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<sup>19</sup> Interviews with PMC monitors and UDN staff.

<sup>20</sup> Although this is encouraged the provincial members still rely largely on the secretariat's materials at the moment although their own capacity to produce materials is improving. [Interviews with Theresa Cheve and Mulleya Hachiinda]

<sup>21</sup> JCTR is concerned that the government only wants to hear 'provincial voices' and that if advocacy was done by JCTR itself then the monitors' findings would be ignored by the government. [Interview with Saul Banda]

the FNGOs, the DHMCs and the DAs. However, these have not quashed the expectations of its FNGOs that SEND would provide resources to cover the full costs of monitoring. Thus the FNGOs look to SEND as a donor but this is not SEND's intention.<sup>22</sup>

Likewise, CSPR's secretariat sometimes finds it tricky to manage demands from some of its provincial team members who feel that they should be entitled to more resources from the secretariat than they receive for the work they do, and demands from other members who want to see monitoring activities expand. However, the secretariat believes that it is preferable to have all costs covered from the centre rather than risk that independent financing could lead to fragmentation of activities. The concern is that too much independence at the local level would encourage each provincial network to follow its own priorities which would limit the relevance of their work to nationally identified priorities.

## Equipment Needs and Monitoring Costs

Standard equipment and logistical needs for monitoring and reporting include transport, which few provincial CSOs have access to, computers, printers, telephones and office space. Resources are also needed to pay for organising public meetings and producing reports.

UDN's community-based monitors have least resources available for carrying out monitoring.<sup>23</sup> Since they are lucky if they have access to a bicycle this limits the area in which monitoring can be conducted. Monitors may also lack telephones making communication with district officials and UDN more difficult, and computers on which to write reports to Sub-County and district officials.<sup>24</sup> Monitors perceive that their lack of equipment - particularly telephones and transport - makes them less effective. PMCs are therefore reliant on UDN staff to bring laptop computers to them when they need to compile reports, and a lack of office space means meetings and workshops are held in nearby hotels/lodges.<sup>25</sup>

For those CSOs who draw their monitors from other organisations logistical support is usually less of an issue because they can use the facilities at their workplace. However, SEND's FNGOs often lack these basic inputs and have had to rely on DAs members to produce reports, but the DAs are also under-resourced and have been unwilling to fill other gaps, such as providing transport.<sup>26</sup> Due to transport and cost issues rarely are all members of the DHMCs able to participate. Thus, some DHMCs have formed into sub-groups which monitor those projects closest to their homes.<sup>27</sup> CSPR also provides logistical support to its provincial monitoring teams to minimise costs on the CSOs which host its provincial networks.

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<sup>22</sup> SEND does channel some resources to the FNGOs to administer the DHMCs but these do not cover all costs.

<sup>23</sup> Although the more communities are involved the less need there is for vehicles since monitors only need to monitor what is going on in their own communities.

<sup>24</sup> Although not essential, monitors have also suggested that having digital cameras would facilitate their work. Whilst this might seem a luxury, one Central Government official revealed that he had been motivated to investigate problems at the village level after seeing photographic evidence which was hard for him to ignore. It may also be worth considering whether the use of cameras might facilitate the inclusion of illiterate people in monitoring committees.

<sup>25</sup> Whether or not computers are needed to a large extent depends on the quality of reporting that is demanded, which depends on who they are being submitted to. Lydia Bakaki, Project Office, Human Rights and Democratisation Programme, DANIDA, told how she was happy to receive hand-written reports as a way of minimising costs. However, district officials are much less likely to take hand written reports seriously, and want to receive typed reports. Also reports are much more easily printed and distributed if they have been compiled on computer.

<sup>26</sup> Relying on the DA's to write reports is not satisfactory because they have an incentive to produce poor reports.

<sup>27</sup> SEND Evaluation

Whilst, some central CSOs have less need to provide logistical support to their monitoring teams all of them cover all or a proportion of the expenses incurred by monitoring teams, often on the basis of a budgeted work plan. The portion uncovered must be picked up by local CSOs or the community members themselves (which can cause the latter to drop out). To reduce the costs for community-based monitors it has been suggested to expand coverage of monitoring structures as widely as possible so that no monitor need carryout monitoring beyond his or her village or parish. Whilst this is UDN's objective their own budgets and staff resources limit expansion.

SEND does provide some financial support to its FNGOs but it does not regard itself as the prime funder and FNGOs are expected to find their own sources of finance to resource the GHMCs. However, SEND incorrectly assumed that the CSOs appointed as FNGOs were sustainable institutions with sufficient capacity and resources to undertake the roles assigned to them was incorrect. Indeed, many of them have not been able to take on the FNGO role without being fully financed to do so. Moreover, some FNGOs are resentful that their own resources are being absorbed by the monitoring activities which are not a core activity for them. Thus, the FNGOs believe that they should be receiving more not less financial support from SEND. The DAs are also not providing any resources to the DHMC members to facilitate their engagement in the monitoring activities since they do not have a budget line for monitoring activities. SEND's proposed solution is to help the FNGOs to fundraise. As a result, SEND has committed to provide more logistical and financial support.

## **Access to Information**

Many local government's are suspicious of CSOs' intentions are inclined to withhold data. Typically CSOs have had to seek letters of authorisation from the central government in order to be able to access data. Furthermore, data which is supposed to be publicly available often is not. For example, in Uganda information is rarely available on parish notice boards despite being enshrined in law, and if it is it is often out of date.<sup>28</sup> At best it is available at sub-county government offices. The further data is away from monitors the more costly it is to get it and the greater the delay in doing so. When data is accessed it is often of poor quality and financial data may not be disaggregated which makes it hard to determine what exactly should be going where.<sup>29</sup> Poor data impacts on the quality of monitoring reports.

Despite occasional attempts to obstruct access to data, backing from the central government has ensured UDN has good access to data.<sup>30</sup> Likewise the UJCC claims to have slowly gained improved access to data by persistent engagement at the sub-county level, aided by the involvement of local clergy sitting on the UJCC's monitoring committees, who are apparently trusted to be neutral. However, it is questionable whether other CSOs embarking on monitoring in Uganda have managed to secure similar levels of access.<sup>31</sup> In

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<sup>28</sup> Patrick Wangyama Ngolobe argued that the problem is due to a lack of resources at the sub-county government level to whom the task has been delegated.

<sup>29</sup> PMC monitors have accused local government of trying to hide information by keeping poor accounts but others have suggested that poor record keeping is a capacity issue and not deliberate.

<sup>30</sup> Samuel Wanyaka, Director of the Parliamentary Budget Office, observed that sub-country officials try to protect themselves and frustrate the monitoring process by withholding data.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Christine Nantongo.

Zambia, letters of approval have not always granted access to the necessary data.

In Zambia CSPR, JCTR and CCJDP all highlighted access to data as a key constraint, which reflects the government's mistrust of CSOs. In response CSPR is supporting a journalist-led campaign for the introduction of Freedom of Information legislation.<sup>32</sup> However, conditions for budget support imposed by donors have forced the government to be more transparent and improve its budgeting by, for example, adopting an activity-based budget system which has facilitated expenditure monitoring. Whilst the central government now publishes spending plans in its 'Yellow Book', the State Secrets Act is often employed by local government officials as an impediment to the release of information on provincial level disbursements, and by the central government to withhold data on military expenditure, foreign loans contracted and so on.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the Yellow Book is hard to get hold of and distribute, and the government has no intention to facilitate this, which puts the onus on CSPR to do so.

In Ghana, access to data depends on the relationship between the DHMCs and the DAs: where relations are good access to data has been good otherwise it has not.<sup>34</sup> In general, the inclusion of DA officials in the DHMCs has enhanced access to data. However, data is sometimes unreliable and needs to be cross checked with central government data, or is unavailable at the DA. Some DAs have put up notice boards which announce what HIPC funds have been received, on going projects and project locations. However, others have refused to do so, on the basis that such information should be kept secret in compliance with good accounting practices.

A general problem is that by the time monitors get hold of data the analysis they produce can often be very late. For example, CSPR's budget tracking is undertaken in the third quarter of the year on the previous year's budget. Depending on how quickly the situation changes this may or may not be a problem. In Zambia, interviewees reported that a year time-lag is not significant, but in Uganda it was reported that a 6-month delay can be problematic, especially if local government changes.

Proposed steps to improve data access include: finding informal channels through line ministries and donors (although for unknown reasons the latter channel has not been much used by CSOs despite donors' apparent willingness to provide data to them); independent research; support for public financial management reforms pushed by donors; and participation in government structures.

## **The Robustness of Data and the Push towards the Scientific**

CSO poverty monitoring systems are typically based on qualitative data collection methods and small sample sizes, although DORP also collects quantitative data. Methods such as

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<sup>32</sup> Whilst several interviewees regarded the campaign for Freedom of Information to be important to empower citizens, others have suggested that such legislation may not address CSPR's problems in the short-term which one donor attributed to a lack of data rather than an unwillingness on the government's part to grant access to it.

<sup>33</sup> Apparently some local government officials are not aware that data should be made public, thus it is not purposefully withheld. But there is still a culture towards secrecy. [Interview with Mubita Luwabelwa.]

<sup>34</sup> Some DHMCs have assumed the role of watchdog vis a vis the DAs which has led to antagonistic relations between the two. In these cases where there is a lack of access to data the monitoring process tends to work back to front ie the monitoring teams wait until they observe a project being implemented within their district then they trace it back to the DA.

questionnaires, report cards, exit interviews and focus groups are relatively cost effective and do not take too much time compared to quantitative survey techniques. Because the data produced are subjective, this can be used by governments to rubbish CSO findings, although this points to a lack of understanding of qualitative methods on governments' part. However, it is important that CSOs adopt sound methodologies otherwise this will be used by local and central governments to rubbish or ignore findings. Data quality is key to ensure civil society will be taken seriously.

CSPR has strengthened its poverty outcome data by interviewing government officials as well as community members and triangulating the findings. It has also introduced expenditure tracking to facilitate cross referencing of poverty outcomes with government spending as a means to strengthen its analysis of PRSP implementation and effectiveness. However, a lack of alignment between budget tracking and poverty monitoring processes has prevented this.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, CSPR enlisted the government and the Central Statistical Office to jointly work out a methodology for budget tracking after the government criticised CSPR's methodology. As a result, CSPR was able to push the Statistical Office to produce disaggregated data to facilitate tracking. The improvement in CSPR's capacity to do budget tracking, which was under-estimated by the government, has pushed the government to improve its own methods.

DORP, SEND, UDN and CCJDP have experienced problems with reporting accuracy, which can be a gift to sceptical (or defensive) local officials who are more easily able to rubbish civil society's findings. To address this problem, UDN has improved its reporting training and has given further training to existing monitors to teach them to report more precisely, whilst SEND has had to do further field work to triangulate monitors' findings. However, for CCJDP providing further training is a problem due to a lack of capacity at the centre. Both UDN and DORP propose to employ more highly skilled monitors.

A related issue is that local governments have tried to undermine monitors' findings by suggesting that they don't have the technical competency to judge whether work has been carried out to specification or not. Local councils are able to wheel in engineers and other experts to dazzle and disempower local people with jargon and technicalities, which makes it hard for the ordinary community member to stand their ground in the face of such challenges. CSOs have adopted different positions to such challenges. UDN has tended to argue that technical expertise is not necessary and that it doesn't take an expert to judge whether latrines are functional or whether a crack is a crack. On the other hand, UJCC has taken the approach of hiring in experts as and when needed. Photographic evidence can be useful in such cases.

Small sample sizes also means that CSO data often is not robust if measured against scientific standards. Although steps are being taken to ensure data is as high quality as possible, and that monitoring teams employ standard methods, efforts to ensure good quality data have to be balanced against time and resources limitations. To what extent CSOs should invest time and resources in improving the data they collect is likely to depend to a large extent on what purpose the data is being collected for. If the desire is to feed into evidence-based pro-poor policy making then outcome and impact data will need to be more robust and show trends.

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<sup>35</sup> The lack of alignment may be partly attributed to the fact that the two processes are undertaken by different teams and that training of the teams is also carried out separately. Training both together may be a step towards resolving this problem. Also, advocates need to be trained to understand both sets of data and how they are linked. [Interview with John Milimo.]

However, if the aim is to build up a broad-brush picture of issues and trends to facilitate advocacy and/or to empower local people to engage with policy makers then the pressure to deliver top quality data is less: what is needed is credible evidence. Thus the choice is roughly between a technical input and a political dialogue.

It may be that demands from donors and central governments for more precise information and greater standardisation of data to feed into policy making (and possibly eventually aid allocation decisions) encourages CSOs to shift towards a technical input role. The World Bank is discussing a project with the Ugandan Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) in conjunction with key monitoring CSOs such as UDN, NGO Forum and Community Development Resource Network (CDRN), which aims to better align the various monitoring processes that CSOs have established. The goal is to produce more compatible data. The problem is that each individual CSO monitoring scheme does not have sufficient coverage on which to base nationwide decisions. This means that data from various sources needs to be pulled together to get a better overall picture, which leads to the need for more standardised data. However, CSOs are not using standardised indicators. The Bank is also concerned that there is too much qualitative data and not enough quantitative data.<sup>36</sup> Several Ugandan NGOs are considering adopting similar methods such as using report cards to monitor outcomes to see if this can produce compatible data, although the Bank and other donors are stressing that standardisation of tools and methods is not the objective, but rather standardisation of data is. However, there are concerns from some quarters that standardisation will not benefit the CSOs, and that CSOs might be forced into a World Bank model, thereby skewing civil society monitoring processes away from civil society's own objectives. For example, a push towards collection of more 'scientific' data might tend to exclude less well educated people from participating in monitoring which could impact on citizen empowerment objectives.<sup>37</sup>

## Expansion of Coverage and CSO Partnerships

Typically CSOs are only able to monitor small sections of the population. For example, UDN only works in 7 out of 70 districts, and CSPR works in 6 out of 9 provinces but in only 18 sites. Despite the limited coverage of CSO monitoring mechanisms they have remarkable successes. However, central CSOs are being pushed from above and below to expand monitoring. On the one hand there is pressure from other CSOs, network members and communities who also want to participate in monitoring activities. And on the other, from some donors who would like to see nationwide coverage or at least coverage of a critical mass of the population. Whilst the central CSOs welcome the enthusiasm and would like in principle to increase coverage both CSPR and UDN feel constrained from expanding due to budget and staff limitations. The CSPR secretariat in particular is concerned not to over-reach its capacity, which could threaten the functioning of the network.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Interview with Ruyendo Mukotani.

<sup>37</sup> This might not be significant since monitors already tend to be the better educated and 'respected' community members, and broad community empowerment (at least in UDN's and UJCC's system) is achieved by facilitating open discussion forums in which all community members can participate. However, it might lead to a tendency to try to engage even better educated people on monitoring committees (this is UDN's aim) or even experts (UJCC's aim) which could possibly alienate the monitoring team from the local community at large and discourage their engagement both with the monitoring teams and in public meetings, particularly if debate at public forums becomes more technical.

<sup>38</sup> Where capacity constraints are being felt, the preference seems to be to continue to expand in those districts/provinces in which they are already working and only then to expand to new districts/provinces. [Interviews with UDN and CSPR staff.]



Given the limited capacity of individual CSO or CSO networks to undertake monitoring on a large scale - although faith-based organisation may have greater capacity than most given the reach of church-based structures and networks - to expand capacity CSOs are being encouraged to form linkages with other likeminded CSOs to share experience of how to establish monitoring structures and to build on each others' strengths. Thus partnerships are being encouraged to facilitate a more rapid expansion of monitoring activities, to pull together data from disparate sources so as to strengthen the credibility of CSO analysis, and to harness the capacities of different types of CSOs, for example, service providers and advocates.

For example, DFID and DANIDA in Uganda argue that what is needed is a 'multiplier effect'. This could be achieved if UDN focused less on providing capacity support to its own monitoring network and instead concentrated on stimulating pre-existing CSOs/CBOs and their networks to start monitoring by providing training and capacity building to enable them to import UDN's monitoring system. UDN already plays such a role and has produced a training manual to facilitate this, however, this is not its primary function.<sup>39</sup> CSPR is musing on a similar role for itself. JCTR has proposed that the secretariat should join with other groups outside the CSPR network who are monitoring or are interested to do so as a means to expand monitoring activities rather than expanding its own.<sup>40</sup> Its role could thus be to provide capacity building and advice. CSPR has already started to provide such a function and is considering whether to make this a major activity in the future. For example, it has helped the Zambian Education Coalition (Zamec) with capacity building training for its monitors who are just embarking on monitoring budgets and spending in the education sector.<sup>41</sup> However, both UDN and CSPR have expressed concerns as to whether they can identify 'genuine' CSOs who are working for poverty reduction as opposed to those who exist to make a living. A further problem experienced by SEND is that although it was willing to establish alliances with existing CSOs they were regionally based and few could reach down to the grassroots level. Thus it was necessary to establish new structures at the district level that could.

Both in Uganda and Zambia there appears to be reasonably good cooperation amongst different CSOs doing monitoring and apparently little or no competition. Some CSOs in Uganda and in Zambia have cooperated to ensure their monitoring activities do not overlap - both in terms of location and to a certain extent activity monitored - and even share the same pool of monitors, information dissemination channels and pool resources to hold public meetings so that there is maximum efficiency of resources and optimal coverage. And new collaborations are being considered. For example, a member of CSPR's board has suggested that rather than CSPR undertaking anti-corruption monitoring, it should share any useful information that comes to light with Transparency International, which already has legitimacy and recognition in this area. However, whilst there is cooperation there appears to be a growing number of CSOs who are starting to monitor the same activities, and each CSO is establishing its own system according to its own objectives and is adopting indicators according to its own needs. The implication is that although coverage is increasing this does not mean that data are compatible nor that all provinces/districts or sectors are well

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<sup>39</sup> Whilst there are definitely merits of working with existing CSOs/CBOs rather than establishing new PMCs, unless UDN has more resources to expand staff, the trade-off might be that those PMCs that UDN has already established would stop working unless some other organisation could support them. Also, careful consideration should be given to what impact such a transition would have on UDN's advocacy role and whether this is desirable.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Peter Henriot.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Hendrina Doroba.

covered. Moreover, there is no overall strategic planning to identify what are the priority areas and sectors in which to develop new capacity and employ resources. Thus whilst there is a desire to not tread on each others' toes there is apparently no effective coordination. Furthermore, different systems can lead to problems. For example, if some CSOs pay their monitors this can cause problems for those CSOs who rely on monitors to offer their time voluntarily.

Whilst CSOs such as CSPR and UDN are considering their capacity building role, there is little consideration yet of whether mechanisms might be needed to coordinate the different CSOs doing monitoring or whether national-level forums are necessary to bring them together periodically to share experiences and view points, and whose role this should be. Although, CDRN has started to do a mapping of which CSOs are doing monitoring in Uganda.<sup>42</sup>

### **Contracting-out, Service Based NGOs, and Monitoring**

A report by CDRN in Uganda - *Biting the Hand that Feeds?*<sup>43</sup> - highlights the tensions for CSOs between providing services financed by government and conducting monitoring and related advocacy activities. The problem is that as a service provider, it is difficult to hold the government to account because the government is a principal source of funding. Thus CSOs' emerging role as government watchdog is being undermined by the push towards public-private partnerships for service provision. It has been suggested that local governments are purposefully handing contracts to CSOs with the intention of limiting their desire to play a watchdog role. However, there is also a counter-trend whereby donors are increasingly funding CSOs focused on service provision to start doing policy work. However, the implication is that those CSOs who are willing to monitor are principally foreign funded, which can lead to the accusation that they are working to a foreign rather than a local agenda.

Whilst there may be a conflict of interest for watchdog CSOs who take on service provision functions, is there a case for service provider CSOs to partner with advocacy CSOs to support their advocacy? The Ugandan Catholic Medical Bureau (UCMB) is a good example of a health service provider, which monitors government contributions to its budget (against commitments) and its own outputs, but is unwilling to do advocacy in case it should upset its donors. Despite its own advocacy constraints, as a body well placed to provide information and with an inside perspective it is willing to support advocacy undertaken by others by alerting advocates to problems and up-coming issues and supplying data. However, it monitors only those services it delivers, which means that it has no data on the rest of the health service and thus its contribution to government accountability is limited.

Likewise, Community Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) provides about one third of Zambia's health services and monitors the resources it receives from the government (and others), and accessibility, service quality and outputs of the health services it provides. Whilst the staff is willing in principle to partner with an advocacy based organisation to share its monitoring data, they would be very careful about doing so. Any potential partner would

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<sup>42</sup> Interviews with Moses Isooba and Arthur Larock.

<sup>43</sup> TWijukye, G and others, 2005, *Biting the Hand that Feeds You? Examining Sub-contracting and accountability mechanisms between CSOs and local Governments in Arua and Kabale Districts.*

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need to share the same ideology and goals as CHAZ and not have an overtly political agenda.

Networks such as CSPR which include both service provider and advocacy CSOs and a secretariat that undertakes advocacy on behalf of the network but no service provision activities may be the ideal means of facilitating such partnerships. Such a set up can allow service provider CSOs to pass on their own data to the network or participate in collective monitoring activities whilst advocacy is done on behalf of the network by the secretariat or individually by other advocacy CSOs in the network. Thus service based CSOs can distance themselves directly from advocacy thereby protecting their financial relationships with government, and since the secretariat does not engage in any service implementation it has no financial relationship with government that might compromise its advocacy.

SEND's experience of working with service provider CSOs in the DHMCs is that they tend to have good knowledge of the district and good relations with key district officials. They also have the confidence of the DA officials which enhances the credibility of the DHMCs. However, some objected to CSOs doing advocacy, which they did not regard as an appropriate role, and not surprisingly lacked advocacy skills.<sup>44</sup>

## **Engagement of Government**

The common approach of CSOs to government is one of engagement. UDN presents civil society monitoring as a 'win-win' situation: civil society 'wins' by getting better services and local government 'wins' by getting more value for money, fewer leakages, more control over resources, and awareness of what is going on at the grassroots. Ultimately, both UDN and CSPR hope local governments will recognise the value of civil society monitoring and will step in to finance it. However, governments have not necessarily approached CSOs with the same willingness to engage. For example, whilst CSPR has been cautiously diplomatic around issues such as misappropriation the Zambian government perceives civil society to be antagonistic and anti-government. Thus, it has been unwilling to formally partner with civil society. For example, it dropped out of CSPR's poverty monitoring activities after the first year base-line study was finished, and it recently declined ZAMEC's invitation to conduct joint monitoring of education expenditures.

How much to engage the government or to push for integration into government processes is a tricky question. Independence lends a certain amount of credibility to civil society's findings but a totally parallel process to the government's own is unlikely to be effective. A degree of cooperation with government at certain stages of the monitoring process is vital if it is to have an impact: firstly, civil society needs to access data from different levels of government; and secondly, the goal is to prompt government action to rectify problems or make policy changes in the light of monitoring findings. The implication is that CSOs need to demonstrate where their analysis has relevance to the government's process.

On the whole local government officials and service providers have participated in CSO monitoring processes when requested to, although this has often been minimal, and it is not uncommon for them to be uncooperative and in some cases even obstructive. Typically most require a central government directive before they will cooperate in providing access

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<sup>44</sup> Response to questionnaire.

to data or agree to participate in monitoring teams. Thus a first step for most CSOs is to seek formal authorisation from the central government to undertake monitoring. However, it is not clear that all CSOs receive formal approval, implying that their capacity to effectively monitor is likely to be seriously constrained.<sup>45</sup>

To alleviate local government's suspicions and build support for CSO monitoring processes local government officials are typically informed of how the process will proceed and might also be involved in selecting monitors, identifying sites to monitor, inaugurating monitoring teams, a retreat, or engaged in the monitoring itself.<sup>46</sup> The assumed benefit of including government officials in monitoring teams is that access to data will be easier and local government will be more willing to take any necessary actions to rectify problems.

Once monitoring findings have been analysed they are presented, often in a public meeting, to either the local or central government or even parliamentarians, in order to negotiate corrective actions or demand policy changes. Targeting demands to the appropriate authority is important to ensure actions will be taken, although this is not always possible. For example, UDN involves local government officials and leaders in its Sub-County and District Days of Dialogue because it found that local issues are best addressed by local government.<sup>47</sup> In contrast, in Zambia, CSPR presents its findings to the appropriate provincial and district committees but these have no legal status, which means they cannot take any corrective action. Thus findings also need to be taken to the central government.<sup>48</sup> Alternatively, JCTR's and CCJDP's monitors share their findings with parliamentarians. However, whilst parliamentarians are often willing to be involved in community dialogues, and in some cases have even asked for them, they too are unable to make commitments to take action, not least because they often have little power if they are not in the executive. UJCC takes a slightly different approach. It holds all stakeholders responsible for rectifying problems, thus, public meetings, which involve all stakeholders at the local council level including community members, are organised to collectively agree on what actions should be taken and by whom. There is then a collective report back process. UJCC reports that actions have been quick to be taken because communities do not sit back and wait for the local government to take action. In Bangladesh, in some cases DORP has not been able to present findings to the appropriate regional committees charged with taking action because these are not functioning. Instead it has shared its findings with health providers some of whom have been willing to take action.

Local government engagement in reporting sessions is mixed. Some of UDN's PMCs have observed government engagement in Sub-County and District Days of Dialogue waning over time: those who do attend tend to be relatively junior. It is not uncommon for local government officials to demand an allowance before they will attend public meetings.<sup>49</sup> Alternatively, they might attend on mass to try to intimidate local monitors. Moreover, they often disregard civil society's findings because they do not regard civil society processes as legitimate. Thus, they do not feel compelled to take action in the light of findings. A common response is "to let bygones be bygones". UDN has proposed to introduce Memoranda of

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<sup>45</sup> Interview with Lydia Bakaki.

<sup>46</sup> For example, UDN's process starts with a consultation with local government leaders to help select parishes in which to conduct monitoring, after which parish leaders are involved in identifying candidates from the community for the PMCs. And SEND has invited DAs to inaugurate its joint CS-DA monitoring teams.

<sup>47</sup> Local issues are too small for central government to deal with which means that it often takes much longer for action to be taken if problems are presented to the central government rather than the local.

<sup>48</sup> Provincial line ministries respond to their central government bosses rather than to local government leaders.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Charles Mbeeta Businge.

Understanding (MOUs) with local councils as a means to illicit formal recognition of the PMCs. However, SEND's experience with MOUs between its DHMCs and the DAs is that these are not sufficient to galvanise the necessary government input into the process.

Where formal legitimacy in the eyes of local government may be lacking, having the backing of a nationally recognised CSO can make a difference. Members of UDN's PMCs have reported that they feel disempowered by their lack of status, however, UDN's presence means that they are more likely to be listened to. Local officials are sensitive to the fear of seeing their names in the media or on websites, or the threat of central government action.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, JCTR has found that its public support for Jubilee Zambia monitoring teams during public meetings has been important to ensure parliamentarians' engagement.<sup>51</sup>

Involving local government officials in the actual monitoring process may also not be sufficient to guarantee actions are taken. Whilst good working relationships have been built between DA and CSO staff in most of SEND's DHMCs, there is a tendency for non-DA members to be more engaged in the monitoring activities than DA representatives, many of whom are not active in the DHMCs.<sup>52</sup> This is counterbalanced by recognition from some DA staff that the DHMCs carry out a useful function which the DAs do not have capacity or resources to undertake. However, SEND has been disappointed that the DAs have not taken more action in the light of monitoring reports. This has been attributed to the lack of involvement of the elected DA members, without whose involvement there is little incentive for the DA staff to address issues arising from monitoring activities.<sup>53</sup>

Despite these difficulties successes have been observed and actions have been taken. For example, UDN has witnessed improvements at the village level, including:

- More medicines in health units, greater attendance of health care staff;
- Improved school buildings, facilities and furniture, and housing for teachers;
- Schools have set up finance committees to keep track of how money is spent;<sup>54</sup>
- Improvements to rural roads and new roads built;
- Improved access to safe water through access to bore holes and protected springs and repairs carried out;
- Improved distribution of quality seed and plant varieties and other inputs;
- Supply of livestock improved and immunisation programmes being carried out.

Such steps have had impacts on attendance at schools and health units and have improved welfare and income earning potential. Monitoring can improve provision of public services simply through incentive effects on public employees, without government needing to take action.<sup>55</sup> And in Uganda and Zambia contractors have been blacklisted or forced to redo

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<sup>50</sup> UDN might be a rare example of a CSO that has significant central government backing which means that it can take issues that cannot be resolved at the district level to the central government's Office of Inspection. This gives UDN considerable influence. [Interview with Zie Gariyo]

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Saul Banda.

<sup>52</sup> In a few cases where the DHMCs have assumed a 'watchdog' role in relation to the DAs this has led to an unproductive relationship between the two. [SEND Evaluation]

<sup>53</sup> Send Foundation Evaluation.

<sup>54</sup> Teachers have welcomed PMC activities because previously they were not aware of how much money their schools were supposed to receive. Newly formed finance committees have taken control of school resources out of the hands of head teachers, who have been found to be misallocating money in some instances. [Interview with Julius Kapwepwe]

<sup>55</sup> It appears that public service providers such as teachers and health staff can be positively motivated simply by the presence of community monitoring teams. Both in Uganda and Bangladesh there have been reports of staff returning to their posts, of provision of better services and of an end to thefts and petty corruption. Health personnel in Uganda have welcomed monitoring because they are desperate to be paid by the local government. [Response to Questionnaire; interview with Julius Kapwepwe.]

work, government staff have been reprimanded or sacked, and remedial action has been taken. In Zambia whilst only a few actions have been taken, the impression is that these have served usefully as examples to others. It is not clear why more action has been apparently taken in Uganda than in Zambia. It might be attributed to good follow-up by the PMCs. This can take months if not years and requires persistence on the part of monitors. In general it cannot be assumed that local governments will follow up necessary actions themselves. In the end, whether or not action is taken may depend on whether or not local government officials are likely to be personally affected, for example, by threatening a source of income.<sup>56</sup>

Financial management and discipline in the use of funds, and improvements in central and local governments' collection of and access to data have also been observed by SEND and CSPR. Furthermore, in Ghana, monitoring analysis has influenced and strengthened the DAs lobbying of central government. In addition, increased community engagement and functioning and trusted monitoring structures and reporting processes are by themselves important successes where democracy is the end goal, such as in Ghana.

### **Engagement of CSOs in Government Monitoring Systems**

From the other perspective, central and local governments' efforts to engage national and local CSOs in their monitoring mechanisms have been mixed and inconsistent. For example, in Uganda the MFPED is formulating a project with CSOs to improve its partnership with them to monitor public expenditures. UDN also participates in the government's annual Public Expenditure Review meetings, and is a member of a committee convened by the Minister of Ethics and Integrity. Yet, civil society has been excluded from consultations on the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) and their data may not be included in it.<sup>57</sup>

In Zambia, the government appointed Independent HIPC Monitoring Committee, which comprised representatives from the government, CSOs and the private sector, was disbanded by the government after it unearthed and made public cases of corruption involving high level government officials. Despite CSO pressure the government has not yet reinstated the committee. The implication is that CSOs such as JCTR working on corruption have no central mechanism through which to feed provincial monitors' findings. In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance's Monitoring and Evaluation department is drawing up a proposal for a new government monitoring mechanism. However, this will not include anyone from outside the government since it is perceived that teams with a variety of stakeholders are unworkable because of their different interests.<sup>58</sup>

Although there are examples of a few enthusiastic government staff who value CSOs' monitoring activities, if there is no concerted political will on the part of the central government to support even its own monitoring mechanisms and to take action where discrepancies are identified, then it can be very difficult for civil society to influence the

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<sup>56</sup> There are often local government interests behind contractors, thus challenging the contractors can threaten the government officials. This problem may become greater as service delivery becomes more decentralised and as more public-private partnerships for service delivery are entered into.

<sup>57</sup> Interviews with Peter Ssentongo and Arthur Larock.

<sup>58</sup> Interview with Mrs F. Chongola.

government to take action.<sup>59</sup> Whilst civil society can push from the bottom up it needs central government to champion the cause from the top down. According to Arthur Larock, “The most important aspect for success is the political support and will of the government...the appreciation of issues by people at the centre is what will make fundamental change.” On its own, civil society has very little means at its disposal to challenge government other than through litigation which is costly, time consuming, and highly political.<sup>60</sup> It is for this reason that several key CSOs in Uganda are interested to be involved with the World Bank financed programme with the MFPED to ‘*Strengthen the Government and Civil Society’s Partnership for Monitoring Government Expenditure*’. Although a danger is that this might straight-jacket CSOs into a World Bank model, it could give CSO monitors much greater credibility, thereby forcing the government to recognise the value of their input, to promote CSO monitoring to local governments and ensure their inclusion in government processes.<sup>61</sup> However, the desire for greater legitimacy for CSO monitoring which comes from inclusion in government processes has to be weighed against the threat that CSO monitoring might be skewed towards government priorities, for example, monitoring project implementation rather than outcomes.

## **CSO Data and Budget Support**

As donors shift to providing budget support, as they have done in Uganda and are about to do in Zambia, budget transparency and a focus on results become increasingly important. Donors put their money straight into the government’s budget trusting that the government will implement the budget as it is allocated. However, in the case of Uganda for example, donors are concerned that actual allocations do not reflect budgeted allocations. Since they cannot guarantee how the budget will be spent they must hold the government to account by putting an emphasis on results. Indicators are typically derived from PRSP matrices.

A shift to budget support suggests an opportunity for collaboration between donors and civil society. For example, donors are demanding that governments improve their budgeting processes and the transparency of the budget, both of which makes it easier for civil society to monitor government expenditures. In return, since donors do not have the capacity to monitor budget implementation on the ground civil society monitoring is very useful for them to get a picture of what the government is actually doing, and to compare this with information received directly from the government. Thus civil society monitoring is a useful means to check the validity of government data.<sup>62</sup>

In addition, although donors use government data to determine the results achieved often this data does not reach down to the grassroots. Thus civil society poverty data could provide a useful additional perspective to donors. For example, in Zambia, donors are using CSO data to check against data provided by the government (which is very poor quality) when monitoring implementation of the PRSP and its results. Also, evidence from the ground on corruption issues could be particularly helpful for donors in Uganda who have

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<sup>59</sup> An example is John Nakabago who is the Head of the Construction Management Unit of the Ministry of Education and Sports, and is responsible for monitoring school construction under the Universal Primary Education Programme. His office is not able to monitor school construction on the ground because of a lack of resources. Thus he has taken decisions on where to allocate his monitoring resources based on UDN’s analysis.

<sup>60</sup> Interviews with Charles Mbeeta Businge and Joyce Kokuteta Ngaiza-Rugunda.

<sup>61</sup> Interviews with Rugyendo Mukotani and Arthur Larock.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with Young Kim.

incorporated corruption indicators into the results matrix. For this reason, donors in Uganda are considering bringing CSOs into the assessment process. Although it is too early to tell to what extent donors will incorporate civil society's data and analysis into its budget support decisions it appears that analysis undertaken by UDN on governance issues has already influenced DFID's decision to cut back its budget support to the Ugandan government.<sup>63</sup> The implication for CSOs is that if their data is to be used in such a way, it puts a strong onus on them to ensure that the data they provide is totally reliable. However, is such a relationship useful for both parties? Is this a useful role for CSOs to play? What are the implications for CSOs' relationships with governments? And would such a focus skew civil society monitoring mechanisms away from other objectives?

At the moment there are not good communication mechanisms between CSOs and donors and the lack of CSO attention to lobbying donors might suggest that such a role and relationship may not be a priority for CSOs. However, the Uganda Governance Monitoring Project (UGMP), which is a project of the Dutch-Uganda Platform (DUP) of CSOs and is a means to lobby the Dutch government on corruption, is an example of such a mechanism. Ugandan CSO representation on the platform is under the banner of the Uganda Monitoring Platform (UMP), which is a coalition of Uganda CSOs. The UMP has developed a framework of poverty eradication indicators which are harmonised with the donors' indicators and, therefore, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Each member of the UMP reports on a particular sector based on their monitoring findings. The first report was presented in 2004 to donors, who received it enthusiastically, and to the government, which was defensive. The report will be produced annually and is intended to be a mechanism through which to dialogue with the government.

Alternatively, some donors in Zambia have suggested that monitoring budget support could facilitate a national dialogue as opposed to the typical donor-government dialogue around aid. To facilitate this, the donors are pushing the Zambian government to make its budget reports to the donors public.<sup>64</sup>

Provision of budget support by donors gives them unprecedented influence over a wide range of government decisions. The implication is that they should be accountable to civil society as much as governments should be. Thus there is a case for CSOs to monitor donors too, and both CSPR and SEND have expressed an interest in this. For example, aid predictability is one area that CSOs could monitor. Monitoring actual impacts of policy reforms against the findings of preliminary Poverty and Social Impact Assessments (PSIAs) is another. It may be that national CSOs do not have the capacity to advocate towards donors as well as to their governments. However, ensuring aid quality is a growing concern of many INGOs. Thus relationships could be formed, whereby national CSOs pass on their data on donors to the INGOs who can undertake advocacy with their governments.

## **Report Back and Advocacy**

There is a strong focus on building analytical and advocacy skills with CSOs conducting training programmes at national and local levels. Whilst capacity at the centre is reasonably

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<sup>63</sup> Generally issues other than governance concerns are more likely to be important for determining budget support decisions. [Interviews with Donald Rukare, Felix Kazahura and Jeroen Wismans.]

<sup>64</sup> Interviews with Marriet Schuurman and Makus Nuding.



strong - although staff members are few - local level capacity remains weak but is strengthening. However, there is a problem of how to retain capacity once it has been built.<sup>65</sup> Whilst there is a clear need to develop capacity at the local level, especially in those countries where decision-making about service provision is decentralised, there is a concern that this may detract from national level advocacy. For example, is monitoring HIPC funds detracting from advocacy aimed at improving transparency of government borrowing and ensuring that non-HIPC funds such as new loans are also used for poverty reduction purposes.<sup>66</sup> The CSPR secretariat has also found that advocacy has been constrained at the national-level by the failure of national network members to incorporate analysis and reports produced by the secretariat into their own advocacy.

A range of advocacy tools are being produced including newsletters, ad hoc commissioned reports, radio and television programmes, and websites. Public meetings and radio programmes (especially if in the local language) are particularly effective mechanisms for disseminating findings to local people and for providing them with an opportunity to put their concerns directly to local politicians and demand action.<sup>67</sup> These are key means to engage illiterate and the most marginal people. However, local meetings can become platforms for politicians, thus JCTR has started to focus more on producing radio programmes.<sup>68</sup>

Whilst print and electronic media are considered to be vital means for disseminating findings and getting advocacy messages across, several CSOs felt that they lacked capacity to package information well for the media and to get the media interested in their analysis. It is very difficult to get the media to cover CSO topics unless they have a political angle, however, in some cases CSOs are scared to be overtly political in case this risks being shut down. UDN has had two of its radio programmes taken off air by local politicians who felt they were inciting political opposition to them, and in Ethiopia the government controls the media thus coverage of politically sensitive issues is near impossible except for on regional radio. Political polarisation of the print media can also be a problem for CSOs who do not want to align with a particular party or be seen as anti-government. Moreover, coverage is likely to depend on whether CSO issue is regarded as pro- or anti-government. The reverse can also be true. In Cameroon the media is simply profit oriented and does not have a political agenda.

Without a political tag, the only means to get stories published is to pay journalists. It is also very costly to pay for TV programmes although radio slots are cheaper, particularly community radio which is often free. However, UDN has been able to make a name for itself and thus the media actively seeks out UDN's opinion and takes up their articles free of charge. This may be because UDN is working on corruption which is regarded as a highly political issue. UDN is trusted to give an unbiased and accurate informed opinion.

Newsletters are important for keeping stakeholders regularly informed of monitoring activities and outcomes. UDN has been successful in getting its newsletter inserted into and distributed with national newspapers, although SEND has not been. However, there seems to be a lack of attention to distributing analysis to key stakeholders. For example, although both UDN and CSPR produce newsletters several advocacy targets, such as local and

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<sup>65</sup> Interview with John Milimo.

<sup>66</sup> Interview with Christine Nantongo.

<sup>67</sup> In general, experiences in Uganda and Zambia with the media have been positive. The media has been keen to report findings, and in Uganda the government's response to media reports has been quick.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Saul Banda.

national politicians, local and national civil servants and donors, remarked that they did not receive regular updates. Whilst there were mixed views on the impact of ‘cold-mailing’ newsletters and reports to parliamentarians and local government staff, with some suggesting they wouldn’t necessarily get read, parliamentarians indicated that these are useful sources of information, particularly as they have no capacity to do their own research. However, parliamentarians need to feel assured they have the most up-to-date information if they are to use CSO research in parliamentary debates. An evaluation of SEND found that some DA staff read SEND’s newsletter to keep abreast of what is being reported about them and to compare their performance with other DAs, whilst others ignore it. A lack of staff capacity may explain why disbursement of monitoring analysis seems to be patchy. For example, SEND has been unable to keep its website up-to-date because the staff has spent much more time than anticipated in the field and providing backstopping support to local monitoring teams.

In addition to regular monitoring activities, ad hoc commissioned reports on specific topics can be a useful means to engage central government, particularly if regular monitoring activities are focused on the grassroots which may imply that engagement is more often with local government officials.<sup>69</sup> For example, CSPR recently contracted outside experts to undertake reports on the government’s Fertiliser Support Programme and the impact of the PRSP. It has been useful for CSPR to contract in expertise to supplement its own.

Whilst CSPR’s and UDN’s analysis is widely regarded as good quality, the impact on government decision-making has been hard to determine. A recent evaluation of CSPR concluded that more needs to be done to ensure its analysis is incorporated into government decision-making. To improve impact it has been suggested that CSPR needs to engage with more senior members of government.<sup>70</sup> A lack of policy space for civil society and the lack of a formal decision-making process make it difficult for CSPR and UDN to feed monitoring analysis into decision-making. The efforts of budget support donors to push the Ugandan and Zambian governments to improve planning and decision-making processes and to include civil society in these may help to create space for better engagement by civil society but this must be demanded by civil society too.<sup>71</sup> However, it is suggested that whilst the Zambian and Ugandan governments might appear dismissive and unwilling to admit mistakes in public, in private they are taking note of CSPR’s and UDN’s analysis and monitoring findings.<sup>72</sup> In Zambia, it is a positive sign of the government’s acknowledgment of civil society’s value that the government has for the first time invited CSPR members to engage in the development of the National Development Plan (NDP), on the basis that they can provide alternative views that government itself cannot access.<sup>73</sup> However, UDN argues that ultimately government’s decisions are determined by the politics of the day, which determines how monitoring findings can be used to influence policy change.

Budget monitoring is perceived to be a powerful tool for engaging in the policy process since all decisions ultimately come down to resources: the budget is the expression of policy implementation. For example, in Uganda, whilst there appears to be general agreement on what needs to be done to tackle poverty, these priorities have not translated into budget allocations, which suggests the government is not intent on implementing poverty reduction

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<sup>69</sup> Arthur Larock has suggested that there is not sufficient analysis of inputs, and in particular how commitments in PRSPs are translated into policy actions and budgets. This is one area where ad hoc analysis carried out at the centre could be useful.

<sup>70</sup> Interviews with Grayson Koyi, Marriet Schuurman and Richard Montgomery.

<sup>71</sup> Interviews with Marriet Schuurman and Arthur Larock.

<sup>72</sup> Interviews with Arthur Larock and Marriet Schuurman.

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Chilufya Kasutu.

programmes.<sup>74</sup> Unfortunately, it can be hard to determine whether a budget is consistent with a PRS if the PRS is vaguely defined. Despite the best policy intentions and participatory planning processes, ultimately what decisions are taken depends on what money is available. The problem is that whilst bottom-up planning and budgeting processes can be empowering, particularly at the community level, overall spending targets and budget priorities are often set in other forums and thus budget decisions are often imposed from the top down.

However, there are mixed feelings about whether it is useful to engage in ex post analyses of national budgets since they may have little impact on future budget allocations. According to Daniele Guisti, ex post analyses are too late because by this stage budgets are fixed, instead CSOs need to engage earlier on in sector budget discussions linked to Sector-Wide programmes. Guisti argues that service providers are better placed to push for changes to how budgets are allocated within a sector than advocacy CSOs precisely because they are engaged in service delivery and therefore have some clout. This might be true for determining spending allocations within a sector. However, with regard to allocations between sectors, members of CSPR in Zambia argue that analysis of the overall budget is useful even if lagged since typically allocations between sectors change little from year to year and therefore analysis of previous budgets can usefully feed into advocacy on forthcoming budgets. The key is to ensure that analysis of the previous budget feeds at the right time into current budget preparation: the pre-budget state is crucial.<sup>75</sup> This can be problematic when there are lags in the government's production of budget spending data. Often these lags are caused by delays in spending which in some cases is attributed to delays in the release of donors' funds. A recent evaluation of CSPR concludes that CSPR has successfully contributed towards securing greater budget allocations to sectors important for achieving poverty reduction and improving budget disbursement in these sectors. Although how important CSPR's efforts were compared to other factors such as HIPC conditionality was not assessed.<sup>76</sup>

Likewise, expenditure tracking has been effective in ensuring that communities receive services that have been budgeted for. However, this type of tracking is monitoring the end point of the whole budget process. It ensures what is budgeted for is delivered, but it offers little opportunity or analysis that is useful for influencing the beginning of the policy process, which is the setting of the overall budget and the sector budget ceilings. This is largely because in reality budgeting is not a bottom-up process.

## Conclusion

Civil society organisations are able to set up effective monitoring structures and processes that can produce reliable data and provide spaces for engagement with government. This is contributing to the empowerment of local communities, provision of better services and greater impact of government programmes, improvements in government processes of data collection and analysis, and improvements in public expenditure management. However, impacts on the longer-term goals of increased welfare and democracy are not yet known.

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<sup>74</sup> Interview with Arthur Larock.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with Samuel Wanyaka.

<sup>76</sup> Conditionality for reaching HIPC completion point also required the government to increase budget allocations to pro-poor sectors and to achieve 100% disbursement.

Monitoring structures are being refined over time and becoming more effective and efficient. However, their performance is constrained by poor access to and quality of data; a shortage of skilled people to collect, report and analyse data and conduct advocacy; a lack of money and human resources to expand coverage; and a lack of political will.

There is a tendency on the part of many governments to assume that budget and other government information should be kept secret which has hampered CSO access to data. This problem can be expected to diminish as local governments become more aware of and accustomed to budget transparency policies adopted by the central government in the wake of donors' shift towards provision of budget support. But central governments need to do more to promote transparency to local governments. Donor supported public finance management programmes will also lead to improvements in data collected and published by government. Thus poor data problems are likely to be a temporary problem. In the meantime, CSOs may need to tap other sources to access data, for example bilateral donors (who have expressed their willingness to provide data) and line ministries other than the finance ministry.

Monitoring is a new activity for all involved and so several skills gaps exist. Moreover as CSOs gain experience with monitoring more skills gaps are emerging, which are not just technical but inter-personal, such as team building skills. These too can be expected to be temporary as CSO capacity building programmes gear up to address them. It has also become clear that training is an on-going, not a one-off, activity: not least because monitors' skills need to be regularly updated as monitoring systems become more refined and data collection more sophisticated. Decentralising training by training trainers would seem to be essential to ensure training capacity. However, retaining skilled monitors is problematic. Since monitors are typically volunteers CSOs need to find ways to motivate them through building their ownership of the process and rewarding them through means other than payment. However, the principle of volunteerism could be undermined if new CSOs moving in to do monitoring pay monitors, which could lead to problems for the existing CSOs.

Money constraints impact on quality and coverage by limiting the time that can be spent collecting data and the number of sites from which data can be collected. There tends to be a trade-off between the two, with most CSOs opting for better data and less coverage. Where monitoring activities are financed and managed by the central CSO it can be anticipated that coverage will be more limited than in those systems where local teams can seek their own funding sources and manage themselves. Thus if an objective is to increase coverage it suggests that a decentralised financial and management structure may be necessary. The danger for some central CSOs may be that a more decentralisation will lead to greater independence of local teams, which may not be desirable if coherence is desired. Building good communication mechanisms could counteract this tendency. However, it is likely that a certain amount of coherence and control may need to be forfeited to achieve greater coverage. At present, it is doubtful that local teams have the requisite skills to find their own sources of finance, which for the short-term puts the onus on central CSOs to provide finance whilst building fundraising capacity. In general, managing relationships with local teams can be tricky, especially if they regard monitoring as a source of income, since this can lead to wrangles about what the central CSO should be providing and to whom.

Ultimately, CSPR and UDN both hope that their governments will step in to fund civil society monitoring. This assumes that government will recognise the value of it, and raises the question of how integrated civil society monitoring systems can be with the

government's own. On the one hand integration would give civil society monitors recognition, which they often do not have. On the other, it could undermine their credibility, which rests on being seen as independent. This is important for MPs, for example. Local governments' lack of recognition of civil society's legitimacy to monitor means that government officials do not feel compelled to respond to monitoring findings. This is heightened by the fact that monitors have little muscle, other than public opinion, to force officials to take action. With government financial backing, the assumption is that the government would necessarily promote civil society monitoring to lower levels of government, thereby giving civil society monitors legitimacy, and that action would be taken in the light of findings but this does require central government and/or local political leaders to be pro-active in demanding it.

In the meantime, whether or not action is taken appears to depend largely on 1) how well known the central CSO is and to what extent it can mobilise the media, and thereby public opinion; and 2) to what extent communities can be mobilised to demand their rights. The effectiveness of both means should not be underestimated, but getting results is likely to take persistent advocacy and follow-up. So far, most attention has been focused on getting systems up and running consequently there has been less attention to follow-up and advocacy. This may reflect a lack of advocacy capacity. However, more effort will need to be put into advocacy since monitoring by itself is not sufficient to compel governments to make changes.

In the absence of formal government recognition, civil society's legitimacy rests on the quality of its monitoring and analysis: the more accurate it is, the harder it is to dismiss and the more credibility CSOs have. Thus careful attention needs to be given to building monitors' skills. However, this raises the question to what extent civil society should adopt 'scientific' as opposed to 'popular' methods of data collection. Governments' challenges to CSO's methodologies may push them towards the 'scientific'. To the extent this improves data and analysis it is healthy, but it may also lead to the alienation of civil society from the process, especially if community members are less directly involved in monitoring itself. Whether CSOs should become more 'scientific' is likely to depend on whether it is the data or the process that is most important. This may be determined by how close a relationship with government is desired and whether the objective of monitoring is improved policy or democratic systems. Governments are likely to have a priority for good data that can feed into policy making and less desire to address governance and corruption issues. Thus, a concern about forming a closer relationship with government is that civil society's objectives might be forfeited for the government's own.

The push towards the scientific may also suggest the need for greater coverage. However, careful consideration needs to be given to how much coverage is optimal and whether data collection should be a long-term project for civil society, given that monitoring is a means to an end. Is it the data collected or the political process of monitoring that will achieve the ends? To an extent it will be the two together but it does raise questions of what amount and quality of data is necessary.

Given the cost limitations to expansion, forming alliances with other CSOs is seen to be the solution for increasing coverage, improving information flows and strengthening advocacy. Whilst cooperation has so far been reasonable, with more CSOs establishing monitoring activities attention will need to be given to coordinating CSOs' efforts to ensure the maximum efficiency of resources and to minimise conflicts of approach, data and analysis.

National CSOs might also look to forming stronger alliances with INGOs' advocacy teams. UDN has formed good links to many INGOs who are able to use its analysis for advocacy in the north. With INGOs giving greater attention to quality of aid issues useful linkages may be possible whereby central CSOs can pass on their findings to INGOs, particularly around issues of policy impacts and aid predictability. It could be an efficient use of capacity for national CSOs to focus on national-based institutions and a national agenda whilst INGOs focus on northern and multilateral institutions.

## Appendix I: Key Features of Civil Society Monitoring Mechanisms

Lead or Central Organisation	Uganda Debt Network	Uganda Joint Christian Council	Caritas	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection	Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace and Devt	SEND Foundation	Devpt Org for the Rural Poor
Country	Uganda	Uganda	Uganda	Zambia	Zambia	Zambia	Ghana	Bangladesh
Objective	Good governance; anti-corruption; empowerment of local community	Implementation of PEAP; UPE; democracy; good gov and corruption	Empower communities to demand access to services	Implementation of PRSP and impact on the poor	Pro-poor use of HIPC funds	Access to education	Max poverty reduction impact of GRPS through participation of poor	Improve pro-poor health policy and access to health services
Focus of monitoring	Expenditure and programme tracking at community level		Service delivery	Poverty outcomes; expenditure tracking	Poverty Reduction Projects - quality of construction and corruption	All funds coming into education sector; quality of spending	Good governance, accountability, equity in relation to HIPC funded projects	Monitoring access to health services and quality of services
Composition and location of monitoring team	Community members form Parish Monitoring Committees; grass roots; must be numerate and literate	Retired teacher, teacher, EJAC member, local council official, someone with research knowledge; local communities	CBOs at grass roots	Provincial monitoring teams formed of CSO network members; national monitoring team formed of national CSOs	Members of local Jubilee Zambia provincial teams; monitors also part of CSPR monitoring teams	Parish teams do monitoring and Jubilee Zambia teams coordinate	District teams comprised of FNGO, DA, women, youth, disabled people and technocrats nominated by the DAs	Monitoring in conjunction with the People's Health Movement network
Monitor turnover	Problem: no remuneration ; out of pocket costs of monitoring; reprisals			Problem: caused by death, promotion, change of job		Problem – move for jobs but also want payment	Problem – male monitors demanding payment	
Coverage	7 districts: 1 or 2 parishes in 1 or 2 sub-counties	Active in 56 existing districts, planning to expand to new districts	National – through church network	6 provinces – 3 sites in each	5 teams in 4 provinces, each covers a number of districts	Cut from 10 to 5 provinces due capacity; 3 sites in each	Nationwide: 42 districts in total	6 upazilas
Choice of issues; indicators; data collection	Community/ PMC identifies what to monitor; monitoring against govt programme and procurement guidelines	Community members can raise issues through churches; data obtained by Ecumenical Joint Action Committees (EJACs)	Monitoring against data provided on notice boards; sub-county and parish leaders involved in identifying what to monitor	Core sectors and indicators selected by secretariat based on PRSP matrix; each provincial team selects own priorities too; provincial teams select projects for expdt tracking	Selected Poverty Reduction Projects	Monitor guidelines that accompany grants	Data collected through focus groups and interviews;	
Capacity building	Monitoring methods; data	EJACs do training of	For advocacy	Economic literacy;	Media training at	Economic literacy;	Economic literacy; train	

Beyond data. A Panorama of CSO Experiences with PRSP and HIPC Monitoring

	collection; reporting	religious leaders who train community members		PRA techniques; reporting; advocacy	provincial level	research methods; budget analysis and tracking	the trainers; research methods; reporting; advocacy	
Financial Assistance	To PMCs for logistical support; work plan and budget submitted; no payments directly to volunteers	Non payment to committees	Don't encourage payment	Cover logistical and admin costs; budget submitted; per diem for volunteers	Cover logistical and admin costs; budget submitted; no payment direct to volunteers; stipend for part-time facilitators	Small token sent to diocese, some of which is paid to volunteers but doesn't cover all their expenses	SEND helps FNGOs to raise funds for DHMCs, volunteers' travel expenses are covered	
Regularity of monitoring	Continuous			Annually	Ad hoc			Daily
Report Back process; dissemination of findings	Sub-county and District Dialogues involving community members and local govt; local radio programmes	Citizens' Forums at sub-county level comprising citizens, community leaders and local govt; all stakeholders responsible for taking remedial actions		Local results reported to Provincial and District Devpt Community Committees	Public discussions at local level involving community, local officials and MPs; National meeting	MPs and community members in local forums	Quarterly report shared with Executive Committee of DA, DA; public dissemination through notice boards, churches and mosques;	Monthly reports at upazila level
Outputs	District monitoring reports produced with UDN's input; ad hoc reports produced by UDN; monthly update	Monitoring reports; radio progs; parliamentary bulletin	Data sent to Caritas to produce reports	Newsletter; ad hoc reports	Radio progs; provincial monitoring reports; national monitoring report; website	No national report in last 2 years because provincial reporting was too poor; Lusaka report ok	Website; newsletter; annual report card; ad hoc reports and briefings; national lobby week; workshops	annual report; newsletter; TV progs; documentary video; mass meetings
Advocacy targets at local level and centre	Sub-county and District govt officials at local level; central govt, donors, MPs at national level	Local councils; parliamentarians	Findings presented to local govt	Local govt; Central govt; MPs		Education ministry, Min of Finance, MPs, and CSOs	Local and central govt; MPs; GPRS secretariat; donors; media; beneficiary groups; CSOs	Upazila Health Advisory Committees; govt; international agencies; donors; NGOs
successes	improved public services, quality of infrastructure, delivery of govt programmes; blacklisting of contractors; staff disciplined			little impact on policy	few cases of contracts being revoked; few cases of disciplinary action against govt officials;		Increase in Public awareness, participation, demand for accountability, and involvement in public policy making	



## Appendix 2: List of Interviewees

### Uganda Interviews: 25<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> September, 2005

- Mrs Robinah Rubimbwa –Board Member, Uganda Debt Network
- Zie Gariyo – Technical Advisor, Uganda Debt Network
- Professor Kakonge – Board Member, Uganda Debt Network
- Patrick Tumwebaze – Acting Executive Director, Uganda Debt Network
- Rugyendo Mukotani, Senior Media and Communications Advisor, Uganda Debt Network
- Jackeline Kabahinda – Consultant
- Moses Isooba – Community Development Resource Network
- Christine Nantongo – Advocacy Manager, Care International
- Daniele Giusti – Executive Secretary, Uganda Catholic Medical Bureau
- Peter Ssentongo – Assistant Commissioner for Coordination and Monitoring, Office of the Prime Minister
- Hon. Bright Rwamirama, Chairman, Committee of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
- Young Kim, Senior Economist, World Bank
- Lydia Bakaki, Project Office, Human Rights and Democratisation Programme, DANIDA
- Vincent Sebukyu, Assistant Direct, Uganda Catholic Secretariat, Caritas
- Vincent Edoku, Uganda Catholic Secretariat, Caritas
- Felix Kazahura, Peace Building and Conflict Transformation Advisor, SNV
- Jeroen Wismans, Senior Advisor, SNV
- Ouma Musuubo, Chairperson, CBMES Committee
- Anita Namara, Programme Assistant, Uganda Debt Network
- Julius Kapwepwe, Programme Officer, Uganda Debt Network
- Patrick Wangyama Ngolobe, Assistant Chief Administrative Officer, Bugiri District Council
- Haji Siragi Lyawala Samanya, Chairperson, Bugiri District Council
- Moses Kintu, District Planner, Bugiri District Council
- Muhamad Nkoto, Parish Monitoring Committee member, Bugiri District
- Mwamje Damalie, Parish Monitoring Committee member, Bugiri District
- Abdu Masanda, Parish Monitoring Committee member, Bugiri District
- Hussein Lukungu Nakendo, Parish Monitoring Committee member, Bugiri District
- Charles Mbeeta Businge, Civil Society Advisor, Department for International Development
- Joyce Kokuteta Ngaiza-Rugunda, Governance Advisor, Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Donald Rukare, Governance/Legal Advisor, Development Cooperation Ireland
- John Nakabago, Head, Construction Management Unit, Ministry of Education and Sports
- Rachel Kaido, Programme Officer, Parliamentary Programme, Uganda Joint Christian Council
- Elizabeth Kisiigha, Deputy Executive Secretary, Uganda Joint Christian Council
- Arthur Larock, Programme Officer, Policy Analysis and Advocacy, The Uganda National NGO Forum
- Samuel Wanyaka, Director, Parliamentary Budget Office, Parliament of Uganda

## **Zambia Interviews: 3<sup>rd</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> October, 2005**

- Besinati Mpepo – Coordinator, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- Gregory Chikwanka – Assistant Coordinator, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- Savior Mwambwa – Programme Officer, Capacity Building and Networking, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- Rasmus Dawes – Organisational Capacity Advisor, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction and MS-Zambia
- Peter Henriot – Director, Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
- Hendrina Doroba – Coordinator, Commonwealth Education Fund
- Ric Goodman – Country Programme Manager, Oxfam GB
- Chilufya Kasutu – Programme Coordinator, Advocacy, Oxfam GB
- Marriet Schuurman – Royal Netherlands Embassy
- Dr Markus Nuding, Team Leader, German Technical Cooperation
- Kirsi Salonen, Programme Officer, Information and Development Policy, Kepa
- Kaputo Chenga, Development Policy Officer, Kepa
- Dr John Milimo, Participatory Action Group
- Hon. Given Lubinda, MP, Kabwata Constituency
- Grayson Koyi, Director of Research and Information, Civil Servants and Allied Workers Union of Zambia
- Saul Banda, Coordinator, Provincial Outreach Programme, Jesuit Centre For Theological Reflection
- Muleya Hachiinda, General Secretary, National Association for Peasant and Small Scale Farmers of Zambia
- Robert Salati, Vice Chairperson, National Steering Committee, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- Theresa Cheve, South Africa Centre for Conflict O? Resolution of Disputes
- Richard Montgomery, Department for International Development
- Joseph Mbinji, Zambia Land Alliance
- Emmanuel Mali, Programme Officer, Economic Justice Programme, Catholic Commission for Justice Development and Peace
- Mubita Luwabelwa, consultant
- Katherine Mulikita, Catholic Health Alliance of Zambia
- Karen Sichinga, Catholic Health Alliance of Zambia
- Beatrice Musamba, Institutional Support and OD Manager, Catholic Health Alliance of Zambia
- Mrs F. Chongola, Chief Economist, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ministry of Finance and Planning
- Engwase Mwale, Executive Director, Non Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council for Gender and Development
- Anayawa Siamianze, Capacity Building and Networking Coordinator, Non Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council for Gender and Development