The Government of China provides the public with scant budget information. China’s score of 14 out of 100 is substantially lower than the global average score of 45.

Drawing on internationally accepted criteria developed by multilateral organizations, the Open Budget Survey uses 109 indicators to measure budget transparency. These indicators are used to assess whether the central government makes eight key budget documents available to the public in a timely manner and whether the data contained in these documents are comprehensive and useful.

Each country is given a score out of 100 which determines its ranking on the Open Budget Index – the world’s only independent and comparative measure of budget transparency.

China’s score of 14 out of 100 is substantially lower than the global average score of 45.
Since 2012, the Government of China has increased the availability of budget information by:

- Publishing the Enacted Budget.

However, the Government of China has failed to make progress in the following ways:

- Not making the Executive’s Budget Proposal available to the public in a timely manner.
- Not producing a Pre-Budget Statement, Citizens Budget, and Mid-Year Review.

Evidence suggests that transparency alone is insufficient for improving governance, and that public participation in budgeting can maximize the positive outcomes associated with greater budget transparency.

To measure public participation, the Open Budget Survey assesses the degree to which the government provides opportunities for the public to engage in budget processes. Such opportunities should be provided throughout the budget cycle by the executive, the legislature, and the supreme audit institution.

China’s score of 6 out of 100 indicates that the provision of opportunities for the public to engage in the budget process is weak. This is lower than the global average score of 25.
The Open Budget Survey examines the extent to which legislatures and supreme audit institutions are able to provide effective oversight of the budget. These institutions play a critical role – often enshrined in national constitutions – in planning budgets and overseeing their implementation.

**Oversight by the Legislature**

The legislature provides weak oversight during the planning stage of the budget cycle and no oversight during the implementation stage of the budget cycle. The legislature does not have a specialized budget research office, and the executive does not receive prior approval by the legislature before implementing a supplemental budget. In both law and practice, the legislature is not consulted prior to the virement of funds in the Enacted Budget and spending contingency funds that were not identified in the Enacted Budget.

**Oversight by the Supreme Audit Institution**

The supreme audit institution provides limited budget oversight. Under the law, it has full discretion to undertake audits as it sees fit. However, the supreme audit institution is provided with insufficient resources to fulfill its mandate and has no quality assurance system in place.

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**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Improving Transparency**

China should prioritize the following actions to improve budget transparency:

- Publish in a timely manner the Executive’s Budget Proposal.
- Produce and publish a pre-budget statement, Citizen’s Budget, and Mid-Year Review.

**Improving Participation**

China should prioritize the following actions to improve budget participation:

- Establish credible and effective mechanisms (i.e., public hearings, surveys, focus groups) for capturing a range of public perspectives on budget matters.
- Hold legislative hearings on the budgets of specific ministries, departments, and agencies at which testimony from the public is heard.
- Establish formal mechanisms for the public to assist the supreme audit institution to formulate its audit program and participate in audit investigations.

**Improving Oversight**

China should prioritize the following actions to strengthen budget oversight:

- Establish a specialized budget research office for the legislature.
- Ensure the executive receives prior approval by the legislature before implementing a supplemental budget.
- Ensure the supreme audit institution has adequate funding to perform its duties, as determined by an independent body (e.g., the legislature or judiciary).
The Open Budget Survey uses internationally accepted criteria developed by multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). It is a fact-based research instrument that assesses what occurs in practice through readily observable phenomena. The entire research process took approximately 18 months between March 2014 and September 2015 and involved about 300 experts in 102 countries. The Survey was revised somewhat from the 2012 version to reflect emerging developments in accepted good practice and to strengthen individual questions. A full discussion of these changes can be found in a technical note on the comparability of the Open Budget Index over time (see below).

Survey responses are typically supported by citations and comments. This may include a reference to a public document, an official statement by the government, or comments from a face-to-face interview with a government official or other knowledgeable party.

The Survey is compiled from a questionnaire completed for each country by independent budget experts who are not associated with the national government. Each country’s questionnaire is then independently reviewed by an anonymous expert who also has no association to government. In addition, IBP invites national governments to comment on the draft results from the Survey and considers these comments before finalizing the Survey results.